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# ***Daily Report***

# **East Europe**

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24 April 1995

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# Daily Report

## East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-078

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24 April 1995

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**Ljubljankic: No B-H Offensive on 30 Apr**

*AU2104210395 Paris AFP in English 2030 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Krakow, Poland, April 21 (AFP)—Bosnian Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubljankic said here Friday that Bosnian government forces would not launch an offensive at the end of the ceasefire on April 30, but would fight if attacked.

"Tensions are growing," said Ljubljankic told AFP.

"In spite of our willingness to maintain the ceasefire, we are not able to sign it.

"There are many signs that the Serbs are preparing offensives on Sarajevo, on our enclaves, on our weakest points," he continued.

"The international community has decreased its determination to enforce NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) mandate concerning Sarajevo. We have been shelled many times without reaction... with heavy weapons... (On May 1) we will fight if attacked."

With the four-month accord expiring, tension has mounted in Bosnia-Herzegovina with sniping and shelling increasing daily. Talks to renew the agreement have so far ended in failure.

**Hungarian, Polish Ministers on European Integration**

*LD2404110495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 24 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Hungarian and Polish prime ministers held official talks in the National Assembly building this morning. [passage omitted] Gabor Nemes reports:

[Nemes] The Hungarians and the Poles try to get into the integration bodies of Europe and NATO holding each other's hands instead of pushing each other away from

the door. At least, when the two prime ministers sat down at the negotiation table in Budapest today, this was the declared intention.

Both Jozef Oleksy and Gyula Horn emphasized that cooperation between countries in our region and the favorable foreign political atmosphere can only help us in our march toward Europe. In any case, the West expects this from us. It is another question that governments can only create frameworks for cooperation, which can no longer be fleshed out with concrete contents at the order of the state. Therefore, the present welcome development of bilateral trade relations means only that by hard work we have reached the level achieved once before, years ago. The personal, tourism-related, or cultural contacts have still not been revived; they have failed to truly adjust to the post-transitional circumstances.

During the meeting, which explicitly had a working character, the two prime ministers tried to deal with the details, the concrete solutions, and not only with strategic matters. We shall see at the news conference early this afternoon what they have achieved.

**Bartoszewski Pleased With Poland's Role in CEI**

*LD2104221195 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The association council of the Central European Initiative [CEI] failed to decide at its meeting in Krakow today on the admission of Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Albania, and Belarus, which have applied to join the organization. The decision will be made in Warsaw in October by the prime ministers of the Initiative's member states. Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski said:

[Begin Bartoszewski recording] We are fairly pleased with the course so far of our participation in the Initiative, and others are also fairly pleased with it. I can reveal that, in today's preliminary discussion, the representatives of countries such as, for example, Ukraine and Belarus greatly raised their hopes connected with Poland's role as intermediary. [end recording]

**Trade Unionists Strike Over Wage Demands***AU2204204995 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1230 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[Article by Aurela Nomani, including interview with BSPSh chairman Valer Xheka in Tirana on 22 April—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Eleven days after a one-hour warning strike, a second strike—this time for one day—organized by the Independent Trade Unions of Albania [BSPSh], started today. The sectors of education, health, and telecommunications all over the country will continue their efforts to have their demands met. Otherwise, they will go on a strike of unlimited duration. [passage omitted]

The eleven days that followed the first one-hour strike did not achieve the result expected by the trade unionists. At a meeting the government representatives held with the BSPSh leaders, the offer was only a 10-percent salary increase, including the index for inflation. Dissatisfied with this, the trade unionists went on strike again today. [passage omitted]

We were told at BSPSh headquarters today that some 80,000 employees have joined the strike. Asked at noon today how he sees the participation in the strike, top BSPSh leader Valer Xheka says he considers it a success for Albanian trade unionism.

[Begin Xheka recording] I consider it a success for Albanian trade unionism despite the fact that the strike today is organized by the BSPSh. In the long run, the achievements that are to be attained through this strike, as well as some other progress, belong to all employees and not only to those who adhere to the BSPSh. [end recording]

[Nomani] [passage omitted] There were also sectors in which work was not interrupted, such as that of post telecommunications. Asked if this could be seen as nonsolidarity with the strike or as a consequence of the existence of various trade union alternatives, Mr. Xheka said:

[Begin Xheka recording] All the trade unions that belong to the BSPSh and those that do not have joined our strike. A part of the activities in the telecom or health services that may function today in Tirana or other cities do so only with the permission of the BSPSh for these specific services, such as the health service, as they cannot leave their patients in an emergency condition, or in other services as well, as this can be accepted neither by the existing law nor by the humanitarian service they represent. [end recording]

[Nomani] It has also been reported that the health and education sectors of the trade union confederation have also proclaimed today a strike day. However, the BSPSh leader sees this as a manipulation.

[Begin Xheka recording] I consider this a dishonest game the confederation is playing, to declare a strike precisely today, because we announced a trade unionist movement several weeks ago, have presented several demands to the government and have gone on warning strikes. It was known by all trade unionists and the public that the strike proclaimed today was to be organized by the BSPSh. If the confederation would like to contribute to strengthening the trade unionist movement and to putting pressure on the government, it should have found another day to go on strike, so instead of one strike day there would be two. [end recording]

[Nomani] Will the strike bring about the appropriate result? Mr. Xheka says it is up to the government to come up with new offers and later up to the trade unionists to review them. Otherwise, we will go on unlimited strike—he said.

**Proposed Tax on Imported Machinery Criticized***AU2404095595 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 22 Apr 95 p 8*

[Article by A. Denaj: "Investors Under the Heel of Taxes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A bill imposing customs duty on imported machinery and equipment directly involved in production has now been approved by the government and passed to the parliament. The publication of this bill has aroused widespread unfavorable reaction among Albanian producers, who have been expecting an alleviation rather than an increase in their existing fiscal obligations.

"The absence of customs duty on the machinery and equipment we import is one form of assistance to the investments we are making as producers," one investor said. "An entire range of taxes weighs upon our activities—from turnover tax, which 'swallows' almost half our turnover, down to the tax on profits and other taxes. After paying all these obligations, the remaining income is only enough for the needs of our families, rather than being profit that can be used to increase investments."

Such a treatment of earnings does not stimulate further business activity, let alone expansion and renovation. Small businesses are at present not only the most widespread but the most successful firms in the modern world. This is a result not only of quick adaptation to the needs of the times, but of fair taxation policies with incentives. The expansion of small businesses has led to a major decline in unemployment. Countries with high productivity and high living standards implement protectionist policies encouraging such forms of economic organization.

In Albania, as always, the opposite is taking place. Instead of Albanian producers being helped and encouraged through grants of credit, concessions in taxation and penalties, and the protection of domestic production

from cheap and substandard imports, the opposite phenomenon is occurring, and investments labor under increased burdens. As far as can be seen, the government is striving to realize its patchwork budget instead of racking its brains for ways of helping young businessmen to invest in economic development, which has ground to a halt in some branches. Many businessmen find it difficult to expand their activities today. "We cannot pretend to buying new equipment, create new jobs, or expand domestic production in order to pose a real challenge to imports.

"The parliament's approval of this bill will therefore not improve but merely further exacerbate the economic and financial position of Albanian producers. The minimum customs tariff of 5 to 10 percent that is expected to be imposed on production machinery and equipment will further extend the long list of taxation percentages and will hasten the bankruptcy of Albanian firms and businessmen, and subsequently no doubt the bankruptcy of the Albanian economy."

#### **Rugova, PR Chairman Godo on Kosova Autonomy**

*AU2204152695 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning, Sabri Godo, chairman of the Republican Party of Albania (PR), received Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova. Godo talked about the support his party has given to the Kosova issue. He recalled a petition organized by the PR in 1993 in favor of Kosova's being a republic, for which more than 500,000 signatures by citizens were collected.

We have been, and still are, in favor of national cooperation, but we are worried over the policy that is currently being followed in this direction, said Godo. The PR favors drafting a sole national platform with a clearly determined strategy and tactics. The waverings in our options cause damages. There has been talk about an independent Kosova under UN observation; there has been talk about Kosova's being a republic; and there has been talk about a confederation with Albania, Mr. Godo underlined.

In his speech, President Rugova said that the areas in the former Yugoslavia are always moving. We are for an independent and neutral Kosova, but if a confederation would be formed in areas of the former Yugoslavia, we favor a confederation with Albania. Regarding these options, all Albanian political forces in Kosova have a common stance.

I have understood President Berisha's demand for mediation by Athens as a demand for a third side authorized by the United Nations. Nevertheless, I agree with you that Greece has vital interests in the Balkans.

As regards the European stance on autonomy in Kosova, this stance has not been determined. The European

politicians do not receive badly the idea of a confederation with Albania. Anyway, we should coordinate our work better.

Concluding, Dr. Rugova said he will soon meet with other parties and associations.

#### **Political Leaders' Disagreements Confusing Public**

*AU2404095295 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 21 Apr 95 p 4*

[Article by Gani Mehmeti: "Trivial Discords or Something Else"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Impatience on the part of Albanian political parties in Kosova—perhaps not extreme but nevertheless evident—has for some time been apparent in our magazines and only daily newspaper. After initial euphoria and a period of false harmony, intolerance has erupted among different groups of the same party. In order to achieve stability, they separated and then squabbled, each group declaring angrily and categorically that its wing was the sole, legitimate and incontestable, party. Accusations were sometimes harsh and immoderate. Each faction clung to the original party name, identifying itself by affixing the name of the party group leader. Divisions of this kind in fact did no harm to the cause in general because their public importance and influence was very small, marginal, negligible. They lived on in the form of press communiques and news conferences, at which leaders rehearse their oratory before their fellow-thinkers and the occasional curious journalist.

However, this cannot be said of the factions of the Party of Democratic Prosperity, whose split shook Albanian politics in Macedonia and greatly discouraged and disoriented Albanians. Neither the electorate nor the factions themselves have yet recovered, despite political statements and attempts to calm the public. Both sides have incited street partisanship through rumors, half-truths, and mutual accusations of failure. Not even the dramatic nature of the situation has helped to reconcile the factions, or encouraged them to follow a single political line or a general concept for the sake of the cause they both favor and for which they have won the electorate's support and votes. The consequences of this capricious intolerance, questionable thinking, and political dilettantism were felt by the University of Tetova and its rector, who is in prison, and by the confused electorate.

The Tetova syndrome was apparent even earlier in Kosova, but there was a leader of much greater authority, who acted with a cool head. Thus, despite open disagreements within a single party and among the different political parties, there were no deep political upheavals, even though there were attempts at such things involving intrigue of the most various kinds, drawn from the old Byzantine arsenal. Publicly, all the

Albanian political parties came out in favor of independence and neutrality. The possibility cannot be excluded that there are opposing views within a given party, just as individuals with public authority make dissenting statements and, in interviews, call for the national unification that is our historical goal. What is astonishing is that these noisy individuals, in the course of their political games, flirt with the neocommunists and those who do not even hide the fact that they would rest content with a little bit of autonomy, regardless of the title given to it. The public is also confused by statements by individuals at the head of the largest party, who, contradicting the chairman of their own party and the president of the republic, come out in favor of autonomy as a transition phase! Whether the person concerned has consulted his own chairman or is acting on his own is a matter for debate within the party. Nevertheless, whereas the president in his visit to Britain was very clear in his demand for an independent and neutral state of Kosova, emphasizing that a transition phase involving an international civilian administration might be a compromise, one of his deputies came out in ZERI with a much, much more modest demand for a transition phase.

In the absence of further first-hand information, it is difficult to tell from the statements published in our press whether these are trivial disagreements. On the basis of interviews and statements, it is difficult to tell where the paths of Kosova's most responsible political and state leaders diverge. One can detect confused realignments, even though their outlines are still obscure. The flirtation of the former communists of Titoite persuasion with former political prisoners, i.e. between the victims and their former tormentors, seems to have faded away. The Kosova Democratic League [LDK], the Kosova Parliamentary Party, and the Kosova Peasants Party alike include fellow travelers of the old Titoite establishment. The former chairman of the Kosova Parliamentary Party was the first to suffer from the rupture of this idyll, and the LDK's deputy chairman would have been the second, had it not been for the Solomonlike intervention of the party chairman. The collapse of this idyll is also evident in the harsh polemics between readers of the magazine KOHA, previously in ZERI, etc. Nevertheless, some public statements by former communist leaders of Kosova that include accusations and outright denunciations of the former political prisoners, have taken these readers' breath away, and they have not received the replies they deserve. It is difficult to understand why the former prisoners remain silent over the aggressive interviews of M. Bakalli, A. Vllasi, etc., because, even in private conversation with the author of these lines, the political prisoners do not say why they put up with the arrogance of those who put them in prison.

The Albanian political parties in Kosova are mainly attempting to capitalize on the errors and organizational shortcomings of the LDK, which behaves as if it were in power and possessed an army, a police force, and courts. The language of their statements is nevertheless so

similar that one is amazed at their sense of logic. The communiques of the Kosova Parliamentary Party, the Kosova Peasants Party, and certain others, and the meetings of their activists in the field are so similar to interviews with members of the LDK Presidium that it is sometimes not clear to the public whether it is the LDK speaking to other parties or to its own members. In other words, LDK activists, instead of debating their differences and disagreements at internal sessions, are trying to solve them with the help of the public and through pressures that provoke reactions like those of fans in soccer stadiums.

### LDK: Serbia 'Abusing Albanians' Patience'

AU2404102495 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 23 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Behxhet Haliti on news conference by LDK Deputy Chairman Hydajet Hyseni in Prishtina on 21 April: "Our Demands Are Not Extreme but a Compromise Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hydajet Hyseni, deputy chairman of the Kosova Democratic League [LDK], said at the start of Friday's [21 April] news conference that the LDK considers the campaign of violence, repression, and political show trials an abortive attempt to vilify and shatter Albanians' peaceful resistance. The LDK therefore reemphasizes the need for the immediate presence of international experts and humanitarian workers at these trials, and once again calls on the international public, including Serbian democratic forces, to raise their voices against the most recent campaign of arbitrary arrests, the use of torture in investigations, and show trials—and in favor of releasing all political prisoners.

### Repression Only Increases

This week was also marked by a further expansion and intensification of the savage and pervasive repression that has been exerted for years on end in Kosova.

On the pretext of searching for weapons, dozens of families were raided throughout Kosova this week. Hundreds of members of these families, including women, children, and the elderly were beaten and mistreated in different ways. In some cases, as in Mitrovice, Vushtrri [Vucitrre], etc., the police also intervened in schools, beating and humiliating teachers before the eyes of their pupils. In the case of Studencan near Prishtina, the police also forcibly prevented sporting events. There were also cases of attacks on cultural monuments. The campaign of harassment and the arrests of political and trade union activists and charity workers also continued with added intensity.

The activists of the Albanian National Democratic Party were sentenced to prison in Prizren on the basis of unfounded and stereotypical accusations. A judicial farce concluded in Peje [Pec] against activists of the

trade union of the former personnel of the Kosova Secretariat for Internal Affairs, and another trial, also a staged farce, began. The detention and investigation of former local officials in the commune of Gjilan continued. On the pretext of protecting a territorial integrity that does not exist, investigations were begun against leading activists of Kacanik commune, while there were also arrests on similar pretexts in Kamenice, Viti [Vitina], etc. It must be emphasized that the great majority of those arrested in the most recent campaign have been exposed to the most varied and savage forms of violence, torture, threats, and blackmail.

The heavy concentration of police and military forces in the region of Kline and the serious situation this has created have given rise to particular anxiety among the people of Kosova, Hyseni continued. Official Serbian sources issued a belated explanation claiming that military exercises are involved. However, the unusual setting and uniforms, the particularly uncouth behavior of the Army and the police, their entry into and occupation of school premises, their manhandling of Albanian citizens even in their own homes and yards, and the damage done to crops and other property show that it is not a question of ordinary military maneuvers.

#### **Serbia Loots 20 Million Marks**

Kosova and its citizens, shopkeepers, and businessmen were also subjected to an unprecedented looting campaign last week. According to Serbian official statistics, the Financial Police—composed of mixed personnel from Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nis, Kragujevac, and Prishtina—conducted 466 inspections within four days in Mitrovica alone, yielding about 2 million German marks. According to as yet incomplete data, the value of assets looted in Kosova in the last few days exceeds 20 million marks, Hyseni said. It must be observed that all this is part of the official Serbian policy to obstruct all forms of Albanian economic activity and business; stifle private initiative; destroy the basis of the Albanians' livelihood and, as a result, expel them from Kosova and Serbize the area. We therefore repeat our demand that any easing of the international sanctions against Serbia be made conditional on the immediate lifting of Serbia's intolerable and entirely unjustifiable sanctions against Kosova and on a fair solution to the Kosova issue.

Hyseni continued: The fact that this intensification of Serbian state violence and terror is occurring at the very moment the issue of Kosova is joining the list of issues being posed for solution exposes the demagogic falsity of the repeated statements by the political leadership of Belgrade claiming that they are ready for a peaceful solution to the issue of Kosova through dialogue. It is now clear to everybody that the Serbian leadership is abusing Albanians' patience. Nevertheless, this will not divert us from the road toward a fair and long-term solution by peaceful means to the problem of Kosova.

In order to create preconditions for such a solution, we once again stress the importance of meetings held by

President Ibrahim Rugova with the most senior British officials and, most recently, with the topmost leadership of the Republic of Albania and the leaders of all the political parties in Albania, Hyseni said. President Rugova's meetings in Albania are a confirmation of our consistent aim for fraternal cooperation with all political forces in Albania in order to fairly and peacefully solve the Albanian national question, something that cannot fail to be a priority for all Albanian political forces. Intra-Albanian cooperation not only does no harm to other peoples and their genuine interests, but, on the contrary, creates the preconditions for peace and stability in the region and for the natural processes of integration in the Balkans, Europe, and beyond, Hyseni concluded.

#### **There Is General Consensus on the Main Issues**

Asked by a journalist whether the Serbian state's supposed criminal prosecution of the culprits of the most serious crimes against the Kosova Albanians—including the prosecution of policemen—is not a farce, or whether it is a matter of some kind of change in Serbian policy toward Albanians, Hydajet Hyseni replied that we would like this to be a sign of a change in Serbian policy, but the facts testify otherwise. In the past, too, there have been indisputable cases of murder. The repressive Serbian authorities have admitted a case of murder on only one occasion, when confronted with undeniable facts attested to by representatives of the then CSCE mission. In this case (the murder of Adem Zeqiri), charges were filed against the culprit—but these were charges of exceeding authority, not of murder. However, we note that the culprits of even the most serious crimes are not prosecuted in Kosova. We even possess indisputable evidence of the promotion of criminals, such as the case of Boban Krstic, the murderer of the seven-year-old boy Fidan Brestovci. Any possible trial mounted by the state to prosecute the culprits of crimes against Albanians is therefore merely an attempt to throw dust in the eyes of the public, and not to genuinely prosecute and punish those guilty of such crimes. The fact that such brutal behavior against citizens is also evident in Serbia itself—as in the recent case in which a Serb was killed by truncheon blows in Belgrade—shows that if the members of a police force are emboldened to bully the members of another people, they will one day turn against their own people.

Replying to a question from a Serbian journalist about the possibility of Albanian-Serbian dialogue and alleged conflicts within the Albanian political parties in Kosova and the LDK itself, Hyseni said that the entire political course of the LDK and the democratic movement in Kosova is the best testimony to our efforts to peacefully solve the problem of Kosova by political means, i.e. through dialogue. We always have been, and remain, in favor of genuine, equal, and fruitful dialogue. We are not in the least interested in diabolical games with dialogue. We think that real dialogue must involve the elected representatives of the two peoples and, for well-known reasons, the presence of international mediators.

So far, said Hyseni, we have not noticed any readiness for genuine dialogue on the Serbian side. As for the alleged conflict within the LDK and the other Albanian political parties in Kosova, Hyseni said that the LDK is a broad movement, and it is therefore entirely natural that there should be some disagreement and different approaches to certain problems within it, and all the more so within the general Albanian movement, which is extremely broad. Nevertheless, Hyseni said, those who want to see splits in the LDK and the general Albanian movement will be disappointed. There have not been, are not, and will not be, any conflicts or splits in the Albanian political movement. There is broad consensus on the main issues and I am convinced that this will also be the case in the future.

Asked by a Serbian journalist how the LDK comments on the statements of certain analysts that one can see in the communique following the Berisha-Rugova meeting that the Albanians of Kosova are presenting their maximum demands, and that something of this kind was also evident in Dr. Rugova's meetings with the political leaders of Albania, Hydajet Hyseni replied that we have never emphasized our maximum demands. Such maximum demands might be for the unification of all the Albanians' historical territories in one state. We have

never stressed these demands. Demands for the unification of all territories in which the Albanians now constitute a majority of the population would not be maximum demands, but would be treated as such. We have not emphasized these demands either. Our demands are not only not maximal, but are a compromise solution—and it might even be said that they are minimal. We have insisted on the independence of the Republic of Kosova within its existing borders, which are very unfair to the Albanians. This is in fact a compromise solution, Hyseni said.

[Box, p 3]

#### **The Secession of the Albanians—European Integration**

Properly seen, the question of Kosova cannot even be treated as a classic case of secession for the simple reason that Kosova has never been an integral part of Serbia. Kosova has always possessed considerable sovereignty, and the demand of the Albanians of Kosova for independence is at the same time a demand for integration in Europe. What is called the secession of the Albanians can therefore be called real European integration. It is Serbia that is cutting itself adrift from Europe and from the process of integration, Hydajet Hyseni said in reply to a journalist's question.

### **Zhelev Discusses NATO, Land Act Changes**

*AU2104180395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] After listening to the views of the representatives of the opposition parties represented in parliament on the Land Act Amendments and the issue of Bulgaria's joining NATO, President Zhelyu Zhelev today invited the leaderships of the extraparlimentary Democratic Alternative for the Republic [DAR] and New Choice to a meeting.

We are for integration into NATO, but not at any price—this was the position stated by the DAR representatives. According to Vasil Velinov, our entry into NATO should be linked with certain specific guarantees that Russia would not be put in a state of confrontation with the East European countries. The NATO issue does not merely relate to military, political, and economic integration, but is also connected with the direction in which Bulgaria will move in the future, New Choice leader Dimitur Ludzhev told President Zhelev.

The leaderships of both extraparlimentary parties advised the head of state to return the Land Act Amendments to the National Assembly. In asking President Zhelev to impose a delaying veto on the Land Act Amendments, the DAR representatives asked him to seek a dialogue with the parliamentary majority to persuade them not to pass the amendments again in the same form, which Vasil Velinov said meant disaster for the Bulgarian countryside.

### **Commentary on Approach to NATO, Russia**

*AU2104124195 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 19 Apr 95 p 7*

[Article by Chief Editor Stefan Prodev: "As Long as We Lie on Doorstep"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If you want to enter a strange house, first you knock on the door. Then you wait for someone to open it and invite you in. That is the procedure not only in life but also in politics. The ritual of knocking on the door and waiting to be invited in is one of the classic diplomatic rituals. Without it, international relations would lose their essence and theatrical element. Usually, it is the small and weak who are standing at the door, while inside the big house with the big round tables and flags there are the universally recognized masters of the situation, whose interests are more important than anything else, even when weeping and moans can be heard from outside. First the servants and then the masters peep through the peephole, size up those waiting outside, exchange meaningful glances, and ask the usual questions: "Who are they, and where do they come from?" Then the ministers, generals, and officials utter their stern "yes" or "no." Usually, for a number of important reasons, the door does not open immediately: first, to avoid creating the impression that the house is open to anyone; second, to thoroughly check

the ideas and pockets of those who come begging for shelter; and third, to make it clear that only the most obedient ones are welcome. All this turns the knocking on the door into a unique, continuing, and humiliating check of the willingness to establish contact. Naturally, the weak and small have no choice but to wait until they hear the magic words "you may enter," and cherish a spark of hope. Therefore they lie on the doorstep, pray, swear their loyalty to the strong one, and wait for the door to open. This is how it has been and will be as long as mankind exists. You may enter the master's house only if you prove that you can be an obedient servant.

Bulgaria is one of the countries currently lying on the doorstep. It wants to enter the big house called NATO and is doing everything possible to convince the masters of its benevolent intentions. There are other countries around Bulgaria, but, as always, it is Bulgaria's behavior that sets it apart. It is the behavior of a small beggar who has completely lost his pride. We do not mean to say that entering the house of a great military power is without specific benefits. In times like ours, when the cages are open and the beasts are stalking freely, it is more than logical to seek security and guarantees. Countries like ours are doomed to seek someone's protection. This is not only because we are situated at a crossroads but also because the nerve fibers of two continents, ready at any moment to bait each other's tails, pass through our country. In this sense Bulgaria has always existed in the shadow of giants, tortured by compromises and hopes. In the past the compromise was called the Warsaw Pact; today it is NATO. Therefore, today, as in the past, waiting at the iron door of a changed Europe is not without prudence. It is simply a part of a general process in which our country has almost no choice. This does not at all mean, however, that lying on NATO's doorstep should become the essence of our national existence. Things are much more complicated and they cannot be resolved simply by opening the door. That is because, despite all qualifications, even the most democratic military bloc is a machine of interests, which could hardly be completely synchronized with Bulgarian interests. We have already outgrown this illusion. Therefore, we should not lose sight of our political pragmatism or dignity while knocking on NATO's door. It is well known that the more you beg, the more you lose the respect of others—especially when those behind the door, the masters of the big house, are not very eager to see you as a guest.

Apparently, Bulgarian politics will lie on NATO's doorstep for a long time and will pay dearly for its indulgence. What is more, Bulgaria's efforts could prove futile in the short run—not because we are strangers in Europe, but because it is not clear whether NATO needs us. Therefore, let us hope that as long as we are begging on the streets of Brussels like the commonest of beggars, we do not forget that Europe is not only NATO; and that in addition to NATO, there is also Russia, which also is active in political affairs. The ideological statement that has recently been aired—namely, that expanding the

Atlantic bloc eastwards will help the democratization of Russian society—is a tale for the naive. When NATO deploys its tanks along the Russian borders no one will be able to predict the behavior of the bear. Unlike countries like us, Russia is not only a great power but also has its strategic interests. We must not lose an old friendship for the sake of a new patronage full of many unknown factors. We must remember this, because Russia exists and will continue to exist, and because Europe—yes, Europe itself, regardless of its consolidation—cannot exist without Russia. If any Bulgarian politician thinks that by entering NATO—whenever this happens—we will solve our national security problem, he is either naive or stupid. Despite the historic changes taking place on the continent, Russia will inevitably play a role in Bulgaria's destiny. This is so not because of memory, but because of its specific geopolitical interests. Let us not forget that we live in the Balkans, which are a part of Russia's interests. I know that many people will jump when they read this, but this is the truth. Bulgaria cannot and should not allow itself to assume an anti-Russian position. It would be lethal for us. Let us not forget that in addition to NATO's door there is another door. It too must open for us if we want to maintain a total European balance. Therefore, while we are knocking as beggars on one door, we should not make ourselves too important in front of the other.

Bulgaria would benefit greatly if it could combine a Western and an Eastern policy. We are too small to rely on one side alone. The strategic scale is a mean factor that could always serve us an unpleasant surprise. The two world wars, in which we tried to tip the scale to one side, should serve as a constant reminder. It is obvious that our national chance does not depend on aligning with one side, but on playing in the narrow but prudent field between the powers. Naturally, this is very difficult—because, as I already said, we have always felt that we need a protector—but it is not impossible. Perhaps, we could play our hand so that we could find two protectors. Let NATO be one of them. But why should Russia not be the other? This is especially true today, when Russia, like us, lives with the aspiration for democracy. I do not mean here soldiers uniforms or types of arms, but the essence of our fate. Only a Bulgarian politician who is able to combine Bulgaria's interests with the interests of Europe and Russia could claim greatness. It is a complicated enterprise, but it is the only useful choice. Only thus could such a politician become a Bulgarian De Gaulle and lead the country toward an era of real national tranquility. Every other road—only with NATO or only with Russia—will be painful and unpredictable. Our real place is somewhere in the middle, where the commitment would not deprive us again of a real chance and identity. It appears that we could learn from Finland's example.

### Videnov Views National Security Concept

AU2404111395 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 18 Apr 95 p 9

[Report on news conference by Prime Minister Zhan Videnov in Sofia on 19 April: "Prime Minister Videnov Answers Journalists' Questions: I Do Not Believe There Is Consensus in Our Society Concerning Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Unidentified Reporter] In his lecture at the Atlantic Club on Monday President Zhelev said that only the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) has an unclear attitude toward NATO. Could you comment on this statement?

[Videnov] I note with puzzlement that the president is analyzing positions with which he is obviously unfamiliar. I mean not only the position of the BSP—one of the few political forces today that has a published concept on national security; most of all I mean the December 1993 declaration of the National Assembly and the position of the government. I would like to point out that the basic thesis of the lectures—namely, achieving consensus on national security through integration—has been worked out by the government of the Democratic Left. This could easily be proven. We are glad that the president is now joining this position.

The president's lecture impressed me with the serious mixup and confusion of the concepts. NATO describes itself as a system for collective defense and not as a system for collective security. There is a great difference between the two. A collective defense system presupposes a clear enemy, or at least a security threat. A collective security system offers maximum guarantees that there would be no enemies and any potential enemies would have no reason to begin an aggression.

[Unidentified Reporter] It is well known that relations between Greece and Turkey are not good despite the fact that both countries are NATO members. Several times in recent years they have been on the brink of a conflict. On the basis of those facts, how would you comment on President Zhelev's statement regarding the stabilizing effect of a future Athens-Ankara-Sofia Triangle in the Balkans?

[Videnov] Recently, for internal party and social reasons I have begun to hate geometry, and especially trigonometry. I recall another triangle. Unfortunately, this is the Athens-Ankara-Cyprus Triangle, which is not a triangle of stability, despite the fact that geometry claims something else.

Naturally, I do not mean that an Athens-Ankara-Sofia Triangle would have the same character, but I see no evidence, and certainly not in the sphere of geometry, that such a triangle would improve regional stability. As a system of collective security, NATO is yet to develop. However, this should not occur as unilateral expansion in the West and unilateral democratization in the East. This is a primitive thesis, and we would be making a

cruel mistake if we were to incorporate this thesis into our understanding of national security.

[Unidentified Reporter] Eventual NATO membership would mean, for Bulgaria, that foreign troops and even nuclear weapons could be based on its territory. What would be the consequences for us?

[Videnov] The consequences would be alarming. I do not believe that there is consensus in our country concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons. The consideration "against" clearly prevail in our party and in myself. The deployment of foreign troops on our territory, including troops under foreign command, is something that has not happened in Bulgaria even during the period of the bloc confrontation. Something like this would meet with decisive opposition. The utilization of Bulgarian troops by a military-political bloc for actions—even peace-making action—on the territory of other countries is exceptionally alarming. Let us recall that there is a declaration that points out, for example, that the Republic of Bulgaria will never interfere directly or indirectly in the Yugo conflict. This is a correct position, and if a contradiction develops between this position and a demand to commit ourselves to resolving the Balkan problems by force, the reaction of our society and political forces would naturally be negative.

[Unidentified reporter] What is your attitude toward President Zhelev's idea to put forward the issue of

working out a national strategy on admission to NATO at the next meeting of the Consultative Council on National Security?

[Videnov] We are prepared to conduct a most serious dialogue on the issues of our country's national security and integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures—and most of all, about the structures of the future, rather than the past and present. We would be pleased to turn the indirect dispute regarding collective security and collective defense into a direct one.

I think that both in President Zhelev's ideas and in the all-European debates on the same theme one should not forget even for a moment the French idea about the parallel movement along several lines: the lines of the EU, the West European Union, and NATO.

[Unidentified Reporter] What would be the fate of the Land Bill if the president were to return it to the National Assembly for a repeated debate?

[Videnov] I would like to categorically stress that without the basic amendments to the Land Bill, and on the basis of the old bill, it would have been almost impossible to return about 50 percent of the agrarian land in Bulgaria to its owners—not after one month, one year, or five years. There are insurmountable technical difficulties. Whoever blocks the amendments to the Land Bill assumes responsibility for completely blocking the process of returning the land.

**President Havel Condemns Oklahoma Bombing***LD2304152895 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1215 GMT 23 Apr 95*

[Interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by correspondent Eva Hulkova on 23 April; from the "Conversations at Lany" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Eva Hulkova, who has prepared today's "Conversations at Lany," says that Czech President Vaclav Havel's ideas are very interesting. [passage omitted]

[Hulkova] We feel it an obligation to discuss terrorism and some of the incredible forms it assumes, the subject that is currently very topical throughout the world. President, I would like to hear your reaction to this situation, given your reputation as a great humanist.

[Havel] First of all, I would like to say that I, of course, feel indignation over the Oklahoma attack. I am shattered and consider it to be a horrible thing.

I have to admit that at the same time this made me think about this phenomenon generally because this is not the only terrorist act. It is just the most striking and infamous one at present. However, we hear about similar terrorist acts—though probably not so cruel and large—almost every day.

For me, the difficult thing in coming to terms with this is the world's impotence. The majority of people condemn this, the majority of politicians condemn it, justice and police bodies are fighting it. However, the world still seems to be defenseless, face to face with a random terrorist attack, a plane hijacking, etc.

The most important thing is to ask oneself what the sources of all of this are, what it reflects, what reasons are behind it. Thinking about it, I feel more and more intensively that this is a certain phenomenon of our civilization, a dangerous and alarming phenomenon of the civilization of our times, which testifies to many things. [passage omitted]

At present, terrorists have gained access to increasingly dangerous tools offered to them by our civilization and are thus more and more dangerous. At the same time, we have failed to create the moral and political climate that would in the first place rule out that anyone would think about doing something like this. [passage omitted] Throughout history, people have always murdered innocent people, but they have never had so much opportunity to do so. I would say that people are the same but that they enjoy many more opportunities now. This is what is appalling and alarming. [passage omitted]

**UNPROFOR Commander Called Home Early***AU2104155995*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech on 20 April on page 3 carries a

150-word CTK report entitled "Replacement of UNPROFOR Battalion Members Started." The report states that 98 members of the Czech battalion of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) left the Plana airfield near Ceske Budejovice for Zagreb on 19 April "to replace their colleagues in the Czech UNPROFOR battalion on the territory of former Yugoslavia." According to the report, a total of 521 of the almost 1,000 members of the Czech UNPROFOR battalion will be replaced by 25 April.

On the same day, on page 5, Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech carries an 800-word commentary by Jan Gazdik entitled "Useful Croatian Lesson." The commentary is pegged to the sixth replacement of the Czech "blue helmets" since the start of the UNPROFOR mission in the Balkans. As Gazdik observes, this latest replacement "was preceded by an unprecedented growth in criminal activity. Fights have been added to petty thefts, violations of regulations by soldiers on guard duty, unauthorized armament, and the trading of insults among soldiers, culminating in the shooting of Captain J.P. and the stabbing of Sergeant P.K." Gazdik links the "latest tragic events in the Czech UNPROFOR battalion" to the person of the battalion's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vojtech Seidl. He says: "The tried-and-tested peacetime commander failed in the Croatian mission, and everything suggests that this happened because of characteristics that inordinately exacerbate relations among people in wartime. Whereas, for a long time, Seidl profited from the reputation of his predecessors, it was during his era that the drinking of alcohol (which, consumed moderately, otherwise eases the stress of war horrors) became rampant in the battalion, discipline deteriorated, and petty crime among soldiers rose. The captain's death and the sergeant's stabbing were only the logical outcome of the chain of smaller and bigger mistakes, errors, and, subsequently, gross aberrations in the lieutenant colonel's dealings with his subordinates and also of his lacking personal example." According to Gazdik, it was only thanks "to a few competent staff officers" that the Czech battalion was fulfilling its tasks: "Seidl's Balkan mission therefore also found its logical ending. He was forced to terminate it a few weeks before his official departure. Nevertheless, the question remains why his superiors had been immune for so long against signals of the difficulties that this otherwise successful peacetime commander had in Croatia. It is hoped that they will arrive at the conclusion that, when appointing people to exposed command posts, personal likes and dislikes, let alone friendships, must be put aside."

In concluding, Gazdik mentions that Seidl has been replaced as commander of the 1,000 Czech blue helmets by Lieutenant Colonel Ludovit Cirok, a "former paratrooper with the reputation of an unconventional, tough, but competent officer."

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### **CSSD: Party Will Not Form Election Coalitions**

*LD2104173095 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The 27th Congress of the Czechoslovak [as heard] Social Democratic Party [CSSD] is currently under way in Bohumin in the Karvina region. Ondrej Kopa from the Ostrava studio of Czech radio reports more in detail:

[Kopa] [Passage omitted] In his address, Chairman Milos Zeman spoke, among other things, about the current situation on the opposition scene. He said that nobody can say that the Social Democrats did not seriously attempt to integrate the democratic opposition. Other opposition parties allegedly destroyed themselves by their colorless politics aimed at the imaginary middle of the road. This is why the Czech Social Democratic Party will follow its own path, without attempting to conclude any fragile election coalitions.

### **No Cooperation by CSSD With 'Extremist' Parties**

*LD2204163195 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] rules out political cooperation with the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], the Left Bloc, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Moravian National Party, and the Association for the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia.

This decision has been made by delegates to the CSSD congress in Bohumin, who approved the conclusions on the unacceptability of cooperating with extremist political parties reached at the previous congress.

However, CSSD Chairman Milos Zeman said that it was necessary to assume a differentiating attitude toward the Left Bloc and the SDL. The most important thing is to keep patiently convincing SDL younger members, above all, that if they consider themselves to be social democrats they should really join the CSSD.

### **Founding Congress of New Communist Party Held**

*LD2204085295 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0800 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The founding congress of the Party of Czechoslovak Communists is taking place in Prague on 22 April.

Miroslav Stepan, a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [KSC] Politburo before the 1989 Velvet Revolution and chief secretary of the Prague city council of the KSC, instigated the launch of this new communist party. According to Stepan, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, from which he has been expelled, has no prospects, and, therefore, Stepan hopes in the disobedience of its members.

The program of the new party is to give socialism a second chance.

### **Parliament Approves 12.1% Increase in Pensions**

*AU2104160595 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 20 Apr 95 p 3*

[Article by "(has)": "Pensioners Will Get an Increase Averaging 408 Korunas as of 1 July"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The real level of pensioners' incomes will again reach the level of June 1992. This is stated in the government's explanatory statement on the pension increase approved yesterday by the Chamber of Deputies. The government said in the statement that the new amendment will lead to an increase in old-age pensions averaging 408 korunas [Kc]—that is, 12.1 percent.

Old-age, invalid, semi-invalid, widows', orphans' and full-service pensions awarded before this date will be increased by 5 percent and by a fixed sum of Kc680 per month. The right to Kc420 per month will be abolished. The same types of pensions awarded in the period between 1 July and 31 December 1995 will be increased by 38.6 percent (also from the current sum after deducting the Kc420) and by a fixed monthly sum of Kc680. A fixed part of the pension will consequently be increased by Kc260 for "new" and "old" pensioners. A widow's pension, depending on the reason it is awarded, will be increased by either Kc50 or Kc100 and will thus amount to Kc1,100 per month. The size of the aforementioned pensions or the sum total of the pensions must not exceed Kc5,100. For pensions that are the only source of income, the maximum sum is set at Kc4,880 per month for couples and Kc2,720 for single people.

Social pensions awarded before 1 July will be increased by Kc260 per month automatically if this involves the income of a single person. If any other family member is dependent on this income, the increased sum will amount to Kc520 per month. The maximum amounts for social pensions are the same as for pensions that are the only source of income: Kc2,720 for single people and Kc4,880 if this involves the source of subsistence for other family members.

**Indefinite, Unconditional NPT Extension Supported***AU2104134295 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 20 Apr 95 p 1*

[TASR report: "Slovakia and Nonproliferation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] New York—"Slovakia is in favor of extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely and unconditionally. We already put forward this point of view during our recent visit to Washington. The endeavor to become involved in a broader system of nuclear nonproliferation and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to third countries is conducive to this," said Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk to TASR yesterday following his arrival in New York. More than 170 signatory states will decide, following a month-long conference, whether the treaty will be extended indefinitely or for a specific period.

**Meciar Meets Italian President, Foreign Minister***LD2104205095 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The attempts to improve business contacts with Italy marked many meetings of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar during his working visit to Italy and the Vatican today. Our special correspondent Michal Tvarozek has more details.

[Begin Tvarozek recording] Before noon, Vladimir Meciar informed the local journalists that Italy occupied only the 8th position among foreign investors and that the involvement of Italian firms in Slovak privatization was not much better. [passage omitted]

Mutual relations were at the top of the agenda during the talks between the Slovak prime minister and Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli, a charming 73-year-old experienced diplomat. Both politicians agreed that it was necessary to revise the contractual base that no longer reflected the existing situation and ambitions of both countries. For instance, the agreement on the protection of investment was not yet ratified by the Italian Parliament. [passage omitted]

The climax of today's visit was the meeting with Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, which the prime minister described as very friendly and open. The meeting again involved a debate on extending mutual connections and economic relations in particular. President Scalfaro assured Prime Minister Meciar that Slovakia and he personally had in him a friend Meciar could always rely on. [passage omitted] [end recording]

**Forced Introduction of Biligual Schools Condemned***LD2104191595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Slovak Republic has held a two-hour meeting with representatives of ethnic cultural organizations, among them the

Csemadok [ethnic Hungarian cultural organization in Slovakia]. Ildiko Nagy reports from Bratislava.

[Nagy] The roundtable discussion organized by the president focused on cultural and educational problems of the ethnic minorities. To a certain extent, the meeting was convened in the name of the International Year of Tolerance. However, the ethnic cultural organizations' cry for help, which has gotten through to the president, also played a role in the organization of this meeting.

By freezing financial support for the ethnic minority associations, the Slovak cultural administration has made the situation of all 10 organizations impossible. Because the president does not have executive power, he cannot change these decisions. However, he promised that he will include what he heard at this meeting in his report on the state of the nation, which will be submitted to parliament in May.

Michal Kovac considers the forced introduction of bilingual teaching in Hungarian-language schools to be a step back. He thinks that this even threatens their very existence. He thinks bilingual education should not be introduced to the detriment of the mother tongue and can only be introduced at the request of the parents, on the basis of their free decision.

The president agreed with the proposal of the chairman of Csemadok that state subsidies for cultural organizations should be regulated by law, so that state officials should not be left to the mercy of various ministers.

Michal Kovac said of the Komarno rally, which is to be held tomorrow, that every individual and community should have freedom of expression in an open democratic society.

**Hungarians Hold Protest Rally***LD2204181695 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] About 5,000 people attended a protest rally in Komarno today. The Union of Hungarian Teachers, parents' associations at schools using Hungarian as the instruction language, and Csemadok expressed their opposition to setting up alternative schools [using both Hungarian and Slovak as instruction languages]. Our colleague Peter Rohac is reporting from the rally in greater detail for Radiozurnal:

[Rohac] Zoltan Sido, chairman of the Union of Hungarian Teachers in Slovakia, first outlined the history of Hungarian education in Slovakia. Commenting on the current efforts by the Slovak Ministry of Education and Science to introduce alternative instruction, he said that today's rally was an expression of protest against this political step. Provided that children's parents insist on preserving schools with the Hungarian instruction language, we will successfully defend such schools, said Zoltan Sido.

He alleged that it is not possible to count on trade unions in this because they have even failed to push firmly for an increase in teachers' salaries, as previously promised by the government coalition.

Unless the government meets our demands, we will engage in civil disobedience, Zoltan Sido said. Preparatory committees are to be set up as early as May, and village self-administration councils will be asked for support.

Edit Bauer, deputy at the National Council, assessed the situation in the sphere of culture. She said that Hungarian culture, press, publishing houses, and information systems are under threat.

The rally adopted a resolution that stresses that, though the Hungarian community is an integral part of the society in Slovakia, it is also a part of the Hungarian nation.

The Hungarian community demands, among other things, to have its collective rights codified. As taxpayers, the Hungarians are entitled to an appropriate part of the state budget and have the right to decide their matters through their own elected bodies. In this context, they demand—unless the current system of state administration is changed—the creation of a central council of the Hungarian community, elected on the entire territory of Slovakia. The council should have the right to decide all matters concerning the identity of the Hungarian community in Slovakia.

#### Civil Disobedience Threatened

LD2204234195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica  
Slovensko Network in Slovak 2200 GMT 22 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Coexistence Chairman Miklos Duray has granted an interview for CTK in which he said that, unless within a month the Slovak Government grants to Hungarian institutions financial subsidies at least equal to those granted last year, and unless it gives up its plans to introduce alternative schooling [bilingual Slovak and Hungarian teaching in Hungarian schools in Slovakia], preparations will be made for a civil disobedience campaign.

He made this statement immediately after the end of a rally of teachers and parents of Hungarian nationality held in Komarno. He went on to say that, unless the Cabinet by 15 May meets legitimate demands aimed at saving the Hungarian minority, adopted at the Komarno rally, Hungarian minority representatives will begin to organize preparatory committees that would force the government to pay attention to them, using various methods including strikes. According to the CTK, this would mean strikes at schools.

#### Reaction From Carnogursky

LD2304164295 Bratislava Slovak Radio Network in  
Hungarian 1530 GMT 23 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the chairman of the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, the ethnic

Hungarian politicians put forward demands at the Komarno rally yesterday, whose fulfillment will be unlawful.

Jan Carnogursky, in a statement to the Slovak news agency, explains that representatives of the political parties at the rally asked for autonomy for the Hungarians in Slovakia. Were it to be granted by the Slovak Government, some of the clauses of the Slovak Constitution will no longer apply to members of the minority. The Christian Democratic Movement, in its election program, repeatedly emphasized that it wanted a society in which laws will apply to all and sundry, and, therefore, it cannot now accept that a part of the country's population might be exempted from the force of the law, Carnogursky's statement stresses.

According to Carnogursky, it must be asked whether yesterday's demands were the first consequence of the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty.

#### ZMOS Reelects Sykora; Meciar Addresses Assembly

AU2104163995 Bratislava SME in Slovak 20 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by B. Koren: "M. Sykora Has Been Reelected ZMOS Chairman"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Presov—The 5th Assembly of the Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia (ZMOS) came to an end in Presov yesterday with the adoption of amended articles, its final resolution, and policy aims. Michal Sykora, the mayor of the community of Sirba, was reelected its chairman. He was the only candidate for this post. [passage omitted] Prime Minister V. Meciar attended yesterday's assembly session with almost the entire government. In connection with the new territorial-administrative division, he said that there are currently three concepts for this. The proposal for a so-called county arrangement is, according to him, historically out of date, and two options are being considered—the division of Slovakia into eight regions (Kosice, Presov, Zilina, Banska Bystrica, Trnava, Nitra, Trencin, and Bratislava), while maintaining the wards [obvod] (from 78 to 128) or a return to the territory of the former regions, which also means maintaining the current districts and abolishing the wards. According to Meciar, the current coalition supports the proposal to create eight regions, and the Party of the Democratic Left and the Hungarian Coalition parties support a return to the former regions. Meciar also talked about the creation of a "rotary fund" for the communities, which should be administered by the Prva komunalna banka [First Local Bank] or by a "newly established bank," and the communities should obtain credit from it at an interest rate of 5-6 percent. According to Meciar, the government is planning "a major investment to construct a high-speed rail link between Cierna nad Tisou and Bratislava through Slovakia's southern sweep." Meciar ended his speech with an appeal to begin the stage of "bringing citizens closer together and uniting

them on the basis of the Slovak Republic's fundamental state interests." "An end to the class struggle and an end to permanent revolutions. Solidarity, cooperation, and teamwork in finding matter-of-fact solutions to the problems of the community, town, and state is what we need," said Prime Minister Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.

#### **Citizens' Petition Demands Fair Privatization**

*AU2104180695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 20 Apr 95 p 3*

["Petition for Just Second Wave of Privatization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We, the undersigned citizens of the Slovak Republic, demand that the Slovak Government honor the original conditions set for the second wave of coupon privatization and that it, above all, allocate property worth at least 60 billion korunas [Sk] for this privatization. Otherwise, we demand financial compensation, to be defined by law, for every Slovak citizen participating in the second wave of coupon privatization.

Given in Bratislava on 18 April 1995

#### **Petition Committee**

- Jaroslav Volf, K. Adlera St. No. 11, 841 02 Bratislava
- Jozef Krumpolec Podjavorinskej St. No. 17, 018 51 Nova Dubnica
- Marta Cerna, Na kalvarii No. 7, 811 04 Bratislava
- Eugen Skultety, Golianova St. No. 21, 917 00 Trnava
- Juraj Durina, Horne Rakovce No. 1377/8, 039 01 Turcianske Teplice
- Dominik Filipp, Male Tatry St. No. 12, 034 05 Ruzomberok

#### **Explanation**

Property worth Sk260 billion has been designated for the second wave of the privatization process. Of this, assets worth Sk80 billion have been originally earmarked specifically for coupon privatization in this wave, so that,

assuming approximately the same participation of the citizens as in the first wave, the share of each participating citizen would approximately equal that from the first wave.

The volume of property designated for the second wave of coupon privatization has been gradually reduced, and lucrative businesses, which would secure real income for the holders of the investment coupons, have been excluded from the process. This results in a situation wherein the property gathered by generations of Slovak citizens will end up, from the will of the present ruling power, in the hands of a small group of businessmen. They become owners without having to pay more than 10 percent of the price of the business, moreover often in payments far beyond the year 2000.

Thus, most Slovak citizens will remain outside the practical reach of the privatization results, and their participation in the second wave of coupon privatization will be just a symbolic alms, the actual value of which for the holder of the investment coupons will not reach even one-third of what the first wave of coupon privatization had to offer.

We consider such a solution unjust, insulting to human dignity, and violating the originally defined conditions under which the citizens entered the coupon privatization and purchased the coupon book. Today, the state uses their money without even informing the citizens to what purpose the funds have been applied.

#### **20 Percent of Households on Edge of Poverty**

*LD2304220895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 23 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kalman has said in the "Kroky" [Steps] television program that, during 1995, some improvements in the social situation of the population of Slovakia can be expected, as indicated by the economic results of the first quarter of 1995. He also confirmed that the social situation is really very complicated. According to recent surveys, 20 percent of households live on the edge of poverty, and 70 percent can afford only the most unavoidable expenditure. [passage omitted]

**Kovacs Says U.S. Supports NATO Membership**

LD2204093595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 22 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs evaluated his visit to the United States by saying that Hungary and the United States might become allies in the near future. According to Kovacs, Washington supports Hungary's admission to NATO and believes that Hungary can be among its first new members.

**Spokesman: Horn Took No Stand in Rail Dispute**

LD2204121095 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 22 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A statement the government spokesman's office reached us a few minutes ago:

Government spokesman Elemer Csak considers the protest by the trade unions of railway employees over a statement by the prime minister to be a misunderstanding. The trade unions complained that Prime Minister Gyula Horn had allegedly said on TV that the trade unions' interference in the organization of labor at the country's largest company was inadmissible.

Elemer Csak stated that Gyula Horn had not even given an interview to Hungarian Television and that the program called "Objektiv" did not claim that the prime minister had taken a stance in the labor dispute between Hungarian State Railways and the railway employees' trade unions.

**Horn Denies 'Political Cleansing' of Diplomats**

LD2204143595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 22 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] There is no political cleansing. This is how we can summarize Prime Minister Gyula Horn's statement on the issue of diplomats serving in foreign countries who are expected to be called back home early by the Foreign Ministry. [passage omitted]

Laszlo Szente interviewed Prime Minister Gyula Horn.

[Begin Horn recording] A large number of people who are unsuitable for the profession are working in foreign affairs. [passage omitted]

My question is: Should we leave the people who have proven their incompetency in these financial circumstances when there is need for the reduction of staff numbers, or should we get rid of those who are unsuitable? Why is this political cleansing? The issue is simply that the leaders of foreign affairs—and I dare say the government and parliament too—suffer from professional incompetency in cases of various proposals and other issues. [end recording]

**'Increasingly Harsh' Rhetoric From Russia Viewed**

AU2004203695 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Apr 95 p 3

[Editorial by Pal Lederer: "Slower With the Fangs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One can (again) hear increasingly harsh and ill-boding voices coming from Moscow. It seems that the Russian political and military elite—which is suffering from a chronic shortage of both foreign policy and domestic policy successes—wants to show by all means that it is still "somebody." Chechnya is not enough. Tajikistan is not enough. Only in words so far, Moscow wants to teach all the successor countries of the former Soviet Union, countries with a large Russian population, the lesson that it will protect its kin even with blood if necessary. The independent post-Soviet states, and mainly the Baltic states have been scared to death by the mere use of the seemingly harmless expression "near abroad" and, if someone might not understand Moscow's coded diplomatic language, he can now interpret the open threat of force.

Moscow is now loud not only with the empirelike fulminations of people like Zhirinovskiy. Today the official Russia is showing its muscles. The meeting of the Foreign Policy Council examined the situation of the Russian population in the other CIS member states and in the Baltic republics, and Foreign Minister Kozyrev made it clearer than ever there that Moscow would not even recoil from direct military intervention in protecting the Russians' interests. It is true, however, that Kozyrev also said that the military option should not be absolutized, but this did not change the fact of the threat. And this cannot remain unanswered. Has the time come for ringing the bells? We hope not. At the same time, precisely on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, one should not forget that, at the time, Germany was preparing for the implementation of its imperial dreams precisely with the slogan "Heim in Reich", the "ideology" of the return of ethnic Germans home, Germans who found themselves living beyond Germany's borders.

As part of the latest display of power, along with the military option to protect the interests of Russians "stranded in the near abroad," Moscow also announced its plan to increase its arms exports considerably, by referring to economic-financial reasons.

All this can also be interpreted in the way that, in its bargaining with NATO, Russia wants to strengthen its position by making it clear that it is not one of many others, but the biggest power in Europe, one that continues to have means to support its position. The question is whether this tactic is productive. It can easily happen that, in response, NATO will also get tough and then it is to be feared that simply a new edition of the Cold War emerges in Europe, instead of the cold peace referred to by Yeltsin at the CSCE summit in Budapest. And, just like the main loser of the first Cold War, the main loser of such a renewed Cold War could again be only Moscow.

Therefore, Moscow needs a different tone and mainly different ways of asserting its interests. Because, although it is a fact that the Russians whom fate dropped

in these countries—and mainly in the Baltic countries—are not treated quite friendly, Moscow would most certainly find partners among the Western powers much faster for protecting the interests of the Russian minorities in accordance with European norms than finding approval for the assertion of its imperial ambitions. Consequently, Kozyrev should better order the Russian fangs to slow down.

### Firing of Editor Sparks Charges

95P20719A

[FBIS Media Note] In early April the Hungarian press gave wide coverage to the dismissal of Attila O. Kovacs, editor in chief of the state-owned daily ESTI HIRLAP, and to charges that the state publishing enterprise's conduct in the case violated press freedom.

According to the daily MAGYAR HIRLAP of 3 April, Kovacs was abruptly dismissed for having allegedly published unspecified "erroneous information" about the sale of the profitable advertising newspaper EXPRESSZ. The prominent independent weekly HETI VILAGGAZDASAG had reported on 4 March that, "in the largest privatization deal in the history of the Hungarian press," the Canadian firm Hebdo Mag Inc. was planning to buy EXPRESSZ from the state publishing enterprise, Hirlapkiado. According to the weekly, "all signs" indicated that contract signing was imminent, "unless, as in the case of HungarHotels, someone interferes"—a reference to Prime Minister Gyula Horn's last-minute veto of the sale of the HungarHotel chain to a U.S. investor.

Charges that the dismissal was a violation of press freedom escalated after several major dailies on 4 April reported that the director of Hirlapkiado, Peter Molnar, obstructed attempts by Kovacs's colleagues to publish an account of Kovacs's dismissal. According to NEPSZABADSAG's report, a blank page in the 1 April ESTI HIRLAP would have included details about the editor's removal, but, at the printer's, the director of Hirlapkiado "removed this page," which "then was published empty." NEPSZABADSAG ran a first-page photograph of Tamas Deutsch, representative of the opposition Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) holding up the blank page of ESTI HIRLAP and displaying it at the parliamentary session that discussed the matter.

Indicating that there was concern in at least some government quarters that the dismissal and the alleged attempt to suppress information make the government

vulnerable to serious charges, on 4 April both NEPSZABADSAG and the daily MAGYAR NEMZET reported that Privatization Minister Tamas Suchman initiated disciplinary procedures against Molnar. Suchman, according to MAGYAR NEMZET, called for Molnar's suspension, saying in the letter requesting a formal investigation that the incident represented "unprecedented interference" that "seriously" violated basic rights to "freedom of speech and press" and amounted to "censorship."

According to NEPSZABADSAG's 4 April report on statements made at parliament's 3 April session, the opposition viewed the dismissal and the publication of the blank page not as isolated incidents but as part of a government campaign to restrict the media. FIDESZ representative Deutsch told the parliament that he "saw political motivation" behind the moves and that he considered them, along with the planned dismissals at Hungarian Television and the government news agency MTI, attempts to "intimidate journalists." Agreeing with Deutsch, former Finance Minister Ivan Szabo of the Hungarian Democratic Forum asserted that "the more democracy is perfected in Hungary, the more it disturbs the government," which is especially disconcerted by "dissenting opinions formulated before the public." Jozsef Torgyan, chairman of the Independent Smallholders Party, concurred, saying that Hungary has gotten "further from freedom of the press than it was in the last days of the dismantling of communism," NEPSZABADSAG reported.

The government parties reacted dismissively, NEPSZABADSAG indicated. Imre Szekeres, of the leading government party, the Hungarian Socialist Party, denied the charges, saying that "no one is endangering press freedom" but insisting that, if the director of a state enterprise made "erroneous political or economic decisions," he should be "held responsible." The spokesman of the junior partner in the governing coalition, Ivan Peto of the Alliance of Free Democrats, said that he considered it "unacceptable to dismiss anyone for political reasons," but he claimed not to "know exactly what happened" in the case of ESTI HIRLAP. At the same time, reported NEPSZABADSAG, Peto rejected the charge that the press is endangered, declaring that the best "proof" of press freedom is that the press, despite the tendency of most major Hungarian publications to lean toward the left, is "much more critical" of the present socialist-liberal government than it had been of the previous center-right government.

**Kwasniewski Warns About Stoking Tension in FRY**

*LD2304141695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1319 GMT 23 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw, April 23 (TANJUG)—International factors should take care not to stoke extremism and new ethnic tensions in the territory of former Yugoslavia with their actions, President of Poland's ruling coalition Alexander Kwasniewski told TANJUG late last week.

Kwasniewski, who heads the Democratic Left Union and the Social Democratic Party, gave an interview to TANJUG after a meeting in Warsaw on Friday with a delegation of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the ruling party in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia.

Kwasniewski said he believed a solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia should be sought with those who have opted for positive and moderate solutions.

He said the maintenance of international sanctions against Yugoslavia could encourage extremist forces and make it more difficult to resolve the crisis peacefully.

Kwasniewski said he believed the resolving of the crisis in former Yugoslavia was the most difficult problem facing the world.

Kwasniewski is one of the most influential politicians in Poland and the most serious candidate for Polish president at the forthcoming elections.

Kwasniewski said the current efforts which Yugoslavia was investing to persuade Bosnian Serb leaders to accept the international peace plan for this war-torn region were especially important, because acceptance of peace was much better than new victims and prolonged suffering.

Assessing the Serbian party's visit to Poland and the talks between representatives of the two parties, Kwasniewski said inter-party relations were an extremely important element in promoting relations between two states and also the best way to become familiar with each other's problems.

Asked about the forthcoming elections in Poland, Kwasniewski said Poland should have a president who would consolidate democracy in the country and act in the widest social interest of all Poles.

It is necessary that the president be a man who will work on Poland's integration into European structures, understand the aspirations of others, and help the establishment of such an order in Europe which is suited to this century, Kwasniewski said.

Kwasniewski concluded that his party's campaign 'will be aimed at the future, and not the past.'

**Coalition To Help Lift UN Sanctions on FRY**

*LD2104195195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1833 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw, April 21 (TANJUG)—The president of Poland's ruling coalition, Alexander

Kwasniewski, said Friday the coalition would do its utmost for lifting sanctions against the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

Kwasniewski, who heads the Democratic Left Union and the Social Democratic Party, was speaking with Goran Percevic, vice president of Serbia's ruling Socialist Party.

Percevic heads the Serbian Party's delegation which arrived on a visit to Poland on Thursday, at the invitation of Kwasniewski.

The two sides agreed that their parties, as the leading political forces in their respective countries, could and would work for promoting relations between the nations.

Kwasniewski said his party would work to change the attitude of the Polish media to developments in the former Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia and Poland have traditionally good relations and their peoples share common roots and an anti-Fascist tradition, Percevic said.

The two parties reached agreements on continuing all-round cooperation which they said was a basis for successfully developing Yugoslav-Polish relations.

**Oleksy on EU, NATO, Russia, Security**

*AU2304171695 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Apr 95 p 2*

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy by Zoltan Szalai in Warsaw; date not given: "European Integration Is Our Common Goal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The common goal of joining the EU should make Warsaw and Budapest build even closer ties rather than compete, Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy told NEPSZABADSAG and MTI in his interview. Oleksy will arrive for a brief visit in Hungary on 23 April which means that, in his capacity as prime minister, he will make his second official foreign trip to Budapest, straight after Brussels. Our Warsaw correspondent first asked Oleksy if this political schedule was formed accidentally.

[Oleksy] The order of the visits is not accidental and it in fact has a political significance. Accordingly, Brussels came first because we wanted to express that Euratlantic integration is the cornerstone of Poland's foreign policy. Hungary's second place indicates that the Polish Government attributes great importance to regional cooperation. Traditional friendship links us to Hungary and our goals are also common. This is one of the reasons I believe it worthwhile to travel to Budapest.

[Szalai] What are your views on the future of regional cooperation?

[Oleksy] Indeed, many people have buried the Visegrad cooperation. However, I consider this attitude to be mistaken and harmful. I do not believe that we have

exhausted the possibilities of cooperation among the central European countries; in fact, very many unutilized—mainly economic—areas exist. A favorable political atmosphere has to be established to achieve the goal. Hungary is a very good partner for us in the Visegrad group, in the Central European Initiative, and in the Central European Free Trade Agreement. I would specifically like to talk about the latter with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn because the implementation of a free trade zone cannot be the ultimate goal. Naturally, this is also a general question: Should central European cooperation only be a means to achieving European integration, or does it also have inherent values? I am convinced that these inherent values do exist, whether we are looking at the cooperation of the Visegrad or the Baltic countries. As a matter of fact, after my visit to Hungary, I will also meet Slovak Prime Minister Meciar and I will also raise these issues with him. In my view, cooperation has come to a phase when it is worth thinking about new impulses.

[Szalai] In light of your visit to Brussels, when will Poland have a realistic chance to join the EU and NATO?

[Oleksy] The expansion of the EU and NATO affects all central European countries. This is a common goal for us although we wish to join individually, rather than as a group. The schedule of the admission was precisely one of the major points of my talks. The Polish Government takes a realistic stance just as the Hungarian politicians do. We do not expect the EU or NATO to give precise dates to us within one or two years. At the same time, we would like to see a clearly defined perspective and system of conditions. If NATO and the EU have decided on expansion then it is natural both for Poland and Hungary to wish to know precisely when the talks on admission can begin, what kind of internal changes we can expect in the union's structure, and when. The issue of political dialogue with the whole EU is also very important for us; at the moment, neither they nor we have any clear concept on this issue. This topic will in all probability also be discussed during my Budapest talks. Finally, we also discussed the fight against organized crime—we are not yet properly involved in the European structures in this area. The associated countries will also have to become more active in this area.

[Szalai] Recently you made the decision to attend the Moscow anniversary of the end of World War II. This step seems to have again sharpened your conflict with President Walesa.

[Oleksy] No, I have no conflict with Walesa, we simply have different views on some issues. According to the constitution, the president supervises foreign policy but the government controls it. I accept Walesa's justification for not attending the foreign commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the end of the world war. At the same time, I decide myself whether to accept the Russian prime minister's invitation. I feel that I should go to

Moscow because this is the celebration of the victory over fascism and Poland also played an important role in this.

[Szalai] Do you not think that Polish-Russian relations are worse than Moscow's relations with the other central European countries?

[Oleksy] I do not think that this is the case. Russia has its own domestic problems. Poland would like democracy and European political thinking and values to become stronger in Russia. Naturally, we also have major historical burdens in our relations with Moscow, to mention only Katyn [site of massacre of Polish officers by Russia] or the 1939 Russian occupation. These events must not be forgotten, but they cannot have any effect on our current or future Russian policy. Russian-Polish good-neighborliness is a key issue of Europe's security. The Polish Government is doing all it can for good relations but we do not accept Russia to have a say in issues relating to Poland's security. The question of Poland's NATO membership must be separated from the dialogue between the alliance and Moscow.

#### Foreign Minister on Treaty With Russia

LD2204142595 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 22 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski is of the opinion that there is no ground at present to renegotiate the Polish-Russian treaty. This suggestion surfaced recently in Russian political circles. In an interview for Polish Radio, the minister added that he did not suspect Russia of aggressive intentions toward Poland. Bartoszewski also said that he was not going to play the role of arbiter in a dispute between the prime minister and the president on Poland's participation in the Moscow ceremonies marking the end of World War II.

The minister announced that, during his visit to the United States, he intended to ask the U.S. authorities their opinion on the more and more resolute opposition of Russia to Poland's possible membership in NATO. h1 Envoy Appointed to Polish-Ukrainian Committee

LD2404101495 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0952 GMT 24 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 24 Apr (PAP)—President Lech Walesa on 22 April appointed Andrzej Ananicz as the plenipotentiary of the president of the Polish Republic to the Consultative Committee of the presidents of Poland and Ukraine, the presidential press office announced today.

Andrzej Ananicz replaced Jerzy Milewski, who was dismissed on 19 April 1995, the communique says.

#### Luczak Discusses Concordat With Pope

LD2304183495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 23 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak has said that Pope John

Paul II received with approval the measures of the government and the Episcopate of Poland aimed at the ratification of the Concordat. Aleksander Luczak, who was received by the holy father on 22 April, presented at the audience the most recent decisions reached by the Government and Episcopate Joint Commission.

[Begin Luczak recording] There is an initiative, arising from the last meeting of the Government and Episcopate Joint Commission, aimed at looking at the possibility of creating two documents, which would state the intentions linked with the signing of the Concordat, on the part of the Episcopate and on the part of either the government, or the parliament—this is still to be decided.

The second element is that the government should be the initiator and that it should exert its influence, so that the Concordat documents find their way to parliament. I have in mind here the amendments to the Civil Code and the Law on Freedom of Religion and Conscience. These documents are being prepared. I want to start the legal procedure involving these documents, so that they can come into force once the Concordat is signed, or to create a *vacatio legis* period for them to make it possible for them to come into force at the time [of the signing of the Concordat]. This was met with approval by the holy father. He thinks that this is the right way. [end recording]

[Announcer] Aleksander Luczak said that the publication of the documents prepared by the government and the Episcopate concerning the Concordat, as well as the commencement of work on the part of the Civil Code devoted to marriage ceremonies and the freedom of religion law, should reduce the tensions accompanying the ratification of the Concordat. According to Luczak, the pope thinks that, if the work on the Constitution is delayed, the finding of a solution to the problem of the Concordat ratification should be accelerated.

On the basis of his conversation with the pope, the deputy prime minister expressed the opinion that the [constitutional] provision on neutrality of the state met the intentions of the government and the Vatican.

[Begin Luczak recording] This provision reflects what we have intended: That we do not want to create something that might boil down to church or religious fundamentalism, but at the same time, we do not want a situation that will create very sharp divisions between the domain of the state and the church. [end recording]

[Announcer] Aleksander Luczak said that the candidate for Poland's ambassador to the Vatican has been approved. The name of the candidate and his nomination will be announced shortly. [passage omitted]

#### **Presidential Aide on Cabinet, Russia, Election**

WS2404083095 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA (KONIEC TYGODNIA supplement) in Polish 21 Apr 95 p III

[Interview with Polish Secretary of State Andrzej Zakrzewski, head of the Office of Presidential Political

Services, by Zdzislaw Zaryczny; place and date not given: "The Average Level"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zaryczny] Two months have passed since the government crisis. Nevertheless, the tension in relations between the president and the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party has not subsided. Old disputes have not died down and new conflicts have emerged. Right now, for example, we are witnessing a conflict over the visit of Prime Minister Oleksy to Moscow, where he is planning to take part in the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. Should we get used to conflicts "on top"?

[Zakrzewski] I would like to recall that the government crisis, dramatic as it was, arose because there was no other possibility of making a change—not only a change of the cabinet, but even a change in the post of prime minister. That is one thing. Second, I would not say that relations between the president, on the one hand, and parliament and government on the other are "doomed" to constant conflicts. I believe that as far as this is concerned, the people who say things the loudest here are certain Sejm deputies, as well as the spokespersons of the president and the prime minister.

[Zaryczny] This is a very interesting thesis. Does this mean that the spokespersons have become so independent?

[Zakrzewski] Please make a thorough analysis of the statements they have made over the last few weeks, all those attacks and counterattacks. Commentary has taken precedence over information. One thing about it is rather interesting: Both of them come from the same newspaper—SZTANDAR MŁODYCH. Rumor has it that they even used to work in the same room...

[Zaryczny] Nonetheless, the president himself, without the help of Minister Spalinski, severely criticized the government on several occasions. He threatened that he would give it only two months. He said that the actions taken by the coalition were a "hideous game," etc.

[Zakrzewski] Let us put aside the problem of such terms, the schedule, etc. This is a certain type of rhetoric, with which we are familiar. Incidentally, this specific sentence was about the "timetable" which the prime minister had promised to everyone. However, we do not have to beat around the bush; this coalition is by no means a coalition the president has dreamed of, nor is this cabinet one of which the president has always dreamed.

[Zaryczny] This cabinet is probably not even a dream cabinet for the coalition itself...

[Zakrzewski] I think so. In such a situation it is natural that there is some tension, especially over issues which were supposed to be settled, but which remain unresolved. What I mean is, among other things, specification of the range of [Foreign] Minister Bartoszewski's freedom in making decisions in his ministry. The most

important thing here is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] should be given a statute and the two sections—the changeable political section and the permanent professional section—should be clearly separated. Weeks are passing by and nothing is happening. The situation is similar in the Ministry of National Defense. You are surprised that emotions are also playing a part here?

[Zaryczny] No, I am not surprised. How, then, do you assess the current temperature of the relations between the president and the coalition?

[Zakrzewski] It is on the average level, I would say. The alert temperature is, despite everything, still very far away.

[Zaryczny] This is hard to believe. In this commotion that was caused after the session, initiated by the president, on coordinating Poland's foreign policy? What is your evaluation of it? What really happened?

[Zakrzewski] Be calm, calm, and calm once again. The most important result of this session was that all of its participants accepted the need to discuss their ventures in the area of foreign policy. Quite naturally, the role of the coordinator should be played by MSZ. The conclusion is obvious, but quite a lot of time had passed by until this "obvious" conclusion was officially declared. The president and the present governing coalition may differ on various issues; however, there are also issues which should and must unite them. It is first of all the issue of selecting a worthy representation of Poland abroad. The president bears a special responsibility in this respect—by virtue of the Constitution, he is the primary designer of our country's foreign policy.

[Zaryczny] However, the president refused to empower the prime minister to represent the Polish Republic at the ceremonies in Moscow. Finally, after some consideration, he decided to send you there. Will these differences not be used against Poland?

[Zakrzewski] From the point of view of the president, the issue of selecting a worthy representative of Poland is decisive. I want to emphasize this word: worthy. Apart from holding the office of Polish president, Lech Walesa is also a Nobel Peace Prize winner. At a time when a war in Chechnya is going on—a war which, indeed, is an internal affair of the Russian Federation—especially when we are receiving reports from the International Red Cross about mass murders among the civilian population, the president has decided that he ought not to stand on the official platform in Moscow, take the salute of the troops, and forget what is going on a thousand kilometers away.

[Zaryczny] Lech Walesa's decision coincided with alarming statements by Russian politicians. For the first time we heard in Moscow threats that, for example, while applying for NATO membership, Poland is violating the 1991 protocol on the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, which may bring about far-reaching consequences...

[Zakrzewski] I am following these statements very closely, but I am also trying to pick out statements by journalists and generals who are not cabinet members, as well as all the things that are simply irresponsible. We must understand that in a situation when Russia is torn apart and unstable, and when the Russians feel uncertain in Europe, such views will keep emerging. I certainly do not ignore them, but I do not attach great importance to them, either.

[Zaryczny] How can you explain that such views started to be voiced more often on the eve of the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the victory?

[Zakrzewski] When I was last in Moscow, I saw the Palace of Victory. The design is beautiful and the building itself is very large and impressive. In front of it there is a monument: a 140-meter-high bayonet, and on top of it there is a statue of Nike. All this is really impressive. I think that the Russians, who are going through a period of considerable revaluations today—also as far as the evaluation of World War II, its course, and results is concerned—really need a fresh injection of faith in their own strength, a faith that has its roots in the past. Therefore, I do understand why they are going to great lengths to make their commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the victory such a big event.

[Zaryczny] The Polish president will watch it on television?

[Zakrzewski] Lech Walesa has chosen the most appropriate option: He is not going anywhere on 8 May and he will celebrate this day in Poland. After all, our country was the first victim of the aggression of Hitler's Germany. World War II began at Westerplatte and in Warsaw; when it ended, only red and white-and-red flags were unfurled in the captured city of Berlin. At that time Poland was the fourth largest military power in the allied camp. These arguments are enough to be convinced that the Day of Victory can be celebrated in Poland.

[Zaryczny] Let us now talk about the president's election plans. When he begins his campaign, Lech Walesa will be starting with a very low level of popularity. These are at least the results of recent opinion polls.

[Zakrzewski] It would be worth giving a try to comment on the following phenomenon: When Lech Walesa makes unpopular decisions, his popularity increases quickly, and when he works normally, let us say, routinely, it suddenly drops.

[Zaryczny] The president boasted that he is a crossword puzzle expert. Perhaps that is what matters?

[Zakrzewski] I would not like to reiterate that it is difficult to be president of a country in which one used to call 10 million people by their first names. Lech Walesa is still associated with all those disappointments and concerns which accompany the sweeping social and economic transformations in our country. Governments are changing—six governments have left the political

scene; some of them were more popular, others less. However, Lech Walesa is still here. Aside from that, we should take into account his special mental characteristics and a certain direction in his actions. We may either like it or not, but it is there: Lech Walesa likes to provoke...

[Zaryczny] Provoke?

[Zakrzewski] Yes. Let me give you an example. When he was in Sweden, he said in one of his conversations that he had brought about a change on the political scene by violating the law—a bad law of a totalitarian state. However, under the same law he took his presidential oath. In addition, he committed himself to observing the law which he has violated on many occasions. What does it look like today? The reform of the law is proceeding at a snail's pace. This is why Lech Walesa is nervous, but his actions, which may irritate other people, are to provoke not only discussion, but also changes. He is forcing changes in such a way. The recent actions of the parliament confirm that this forcing is efficient.

[Zaryczny] The preparations for the election campaign are coming to an end. We can already say who will probably run in the elections and what their chances will be.

[Zakrzewski] Can we really? You are an optimist. In a situation when new candidates keep cropping up, such as those of Aleksander Gawronik or Jan Pietrzak, anything may yet happen.

[Zaryczny] I was referring to the favorites, such as Jacek Kuron, not the political "folklore."

[Zakrzewski] I felt sorry when I was watching the debates and the results of the congress of the Freedom Union [UW]. I believe that some kind of a regicide was committed. No matter how we evaluate Tadeusz Mazowiecki today, I considered him the epitome of a character of an independent intellectual. While the "man-banner" of Solidarity was Lech Walesa, his counterpart in the intellectual world was Tadeusz Mazowiecki, founder of the Democratic Union. I do respect Leszek Balcerowicz, both as an economist and as a human being, especially when he presented and implemented his "plan." However, I am surprised that this party, which is a party of "eggheads," of many great personalities, of three prime ministers, etc., has chosen as its leader a man who joined it only a month earlier. However, I am even more amazed that the most popular Polish politician—according to the research you quoted—received only 11 votes more than Janusz Onyszkiewicz when he won the party's nomination for its presidential candidate...

[Zaryczny] The logic of the current configuration of political forces envisions an inevitable electoral confrontation between Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski. Do you think that it will be favorable to our country?

[Zakrzewski] I do not know whether it will be favorable—if such a confrontation is necessary, it will simply have to happen. However, what the work plans of both politicians or the political blocs will look like, remains to be seen. If we look at the situation today, the disciplined camp of SLD seems to be stronger. As far as the post-Solidarity camp is concerned, there are not only many candidates, but also symptoms of an obvious decomposition. Unfortunately, it is not very likely that there will appear something that would unite this camp. This "something" means either an issue or a person.

[Zaryczny] SLD will field Aleksander Kwasniewski and UW will field Jacek Kuron, and Lech Walesa will field... Lech Walesa. There is no camp to be seen—there is only Lech Walesa. Lech Walesa alone.

[Zakrzewski] You know, I am an employee of the President's Chancellery, not a member of Lech Walesa's campaign staff, which, incidentally, has not been set up yet. Trying to dispel your doubts, I must say that I expect that Lech Walesa will turn directly to the people. Above all the parties, which, frankly, aside from three or four, do not really matter. He will try to prove to the people that he was and still is an efficient politician—no one can take it away from him. First of all, however, he will want to present himself as a man of balance—a man who always saw to it that no man, no political option, and no institution dominates the Polish political scene during these numerous whirlpools that accompany the political and economic transformation. He certainly was successful, even though he used various methods to do this—and he did not always receive the best reviews.

[Zaryczny] Lech Walesa says increasingly often that in fact it does not matter who wins because the role of president is very limited in the Constitution. Is it possible that he wants to defer the elections?

[Zakrzewski] It is a fact that the Constitution—in its present form—gives more powers to the parliament. Thus, what is important is not the presidential, but parliamentary elections.

[Zaryczny] Work on the new constitution is in full swing. Over the next few weeks it will be focused on a provision concerning the powers of the president.

[Zakrzewski] I can only suppose that, traditionally, it will be a chapter written either "for" or "against" the incumbent president.

[Zaryczny] It is paradoxical, but as the work of the Constitutional Committee is proceeding, the number of

people who are dissatisfied with the provisions approved by it, is increasing.

[Zakrzewski] I have noticed this paradox as well. It is possible that this is a sign that the draft constitution will be a failure. If the constitutional referendum turns out to be unfavorable to the creators of this draft, that is, to the parliament, it will be necessary to draw conclusions from this vote of no-confidence. The problem of self-dissolution of both houses of parliament will certainly return to the agenda then.

[Zaryczny] You believe that there are no foregone conclusions, then?

[Zakrzewski] I think so.

[Zaryczny] Thank you for the interview.

#### **President's Council Supports TV Management**

*LD2104215995 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The president's Cultural Council has supported the activity of the management of Polish Television. We recall that in our program yesterday, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, the secretary general of the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], was in favor of dismissing Wieslaw Walendziak from the post of TV chairman. Andrzej Braun, chairman of the president's Cultural Council:

[Begin Braun recording] We passed one resolution: that we support the independence of public television under its present management because it is coming under quite a number of attacks; and we support the largest possible share of advertisements. [end recording]

**PNTCD's Ratiu Views Efforts To Join NATO**

AU2304175595 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in  
Romanian 19 Apr 95 p 3

[Interview with PNTCD Deputy Ion Ratiu by Catalin C. Harnage; place and date not given: "If We Do Not Join NATO as Soon as Possible, We Will Be Under Moscow's Influence for Another 50 Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In the fall of 1997, NATO, through its executive forum the North Atlantic Assembly [AAN], will hold a session in Bucharest considered by the majority of West European political observers as very important for the destiny of the countries in this region, including Romania. During the Bucharest session, decisions will be taken regarding NATO's destiny in the years to come, and our country is the first country of the former communist bloc to organize an AAN autumn session. In view of the importance for all Romanian political forces to prepare for this event that can place Romania among the first countries that will join NATO, PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] Deputy Ion Ratiu, head of the Romanian delegation to the AAN, emphasized a few points that are necessary in order to understand the "1997" event.*

[Harnage] From your position as head of the Romanian delegation, which you think will be the first country of the former communist bloc to be admitted to NATO?

[Ratiu] Theoretically, after the Partnership for Peace, all signatory states have equal chances of being admitted to the NATO structures. The way things are now, it is clear that the first countries whose admission to NATO is envisaged are Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia—in this order of priority.

[Harnage] Who do you think will "determine" Romania's admittance to NATO: Washington or Moscow?

[Ratiu] I believe it will be NATO itself, in which the 16 members have equal vote—but certainly the attitude of the United States has a great influence, not to say a decisive influence.

[Harnage] Is Russia the reason that prevents Bucharest from advancing more resolutely toward the North Atlantic Alliance?

[Ratiu] For the time being we are "de facto" rather in the East, because I do not want to say under Moscow's influence. Nevertheless, we are advancing toward NATO; and I hope that this advance will be irreversible. The hesitations of the past and the slow pace in which we are transforming our society to become essentially similar to the NATO member countries, raise question marks.

Therefore, our access or our admission to NATO depends on us and on our future actions. It could be that the somewhat hesitant attitude of Cotroceni Palace [presidency] in the first years after the revolution was brought about by the doubt in the president's mind about the permanent nature of our emergence from Moscow's sphere of influence. Personally, I am sure that if we do not join NATO as soon as possible, we will be under Moscow's influence for another 50 years.

[Harnage] What would it mean for Romania to become a NATO member country?

[Ratiu] The association to NATO means a categorical guarantee of our existence as an independent state. Today, we still do not fulfill all conditions that would qualify us for membership, and among them there are two basic conditions. The first one is to respect human rights, which includes complete rights for ethnic minorities, religious freedom—see the situation of the Greek Catholic Church—to ensure the separation of powers in the state and to have the executive respect legal decisions. The second condition refers to the institutions of the Romanian state—which, in principle, must be of the same type as those in NATO member countries. In the West, institutions place citizens at the center of state life. These can range from Amnesty International, the League of Lawyers for Human Rights, the Council of Churches, the Council of Interethnic Relations, the Scouts, and the Masonic clubs, to the bird-watching societies. From an economic point of view, once we join NATO, I believe that the advantages we will have will notably exceed the efforts and sacrifice we have to make.

[Harnage] Which is the first country in the former communist bloc to host an AAN meeting?

[Ratiu] Hungary is the first NATO nonmember country where a plenary AAN meeting has been held.

[Harnage] Why is the AAN autumn session more important?

[Ratiu] This is always the most important event. That is when decisions are made for the coming year; and every two years, the AAN leadership is elected.

[Harnage] In 1997, on the occasion of the AAN autumn session, might the NATO leading forum be influenced in taking a decision regarding Romania?

[Ratiu] Yes, in 1997, during the AAN autumn session in Bucharest, we will have an incontestable influence on the future course of the Alliance. We might qualify for the status of member country. We might even be admitted with the first group, before the year 2000, a place that currently we do not hold.

### Karadzic Sends Condolence Message to Clinton

LD2204201495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2005  
 GMT 22 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, April 22 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic on Saturday sent his "heartfelt condolences" to U.S. President Bill Clinton over the Oklahoma City bomb blast and proposed a lasting peace treaty for war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"Having been so brutally exposed to the evil ways of terrorism on your home ground, you will be in a better position to understand the fight that we wage here against terrorists and extremists of every hue, including Islamic religious fanatics," said Karadzic. He asked Clinton to invest his "very considerable authority in the efforts to bring peace to the troubled land of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina" and came out with a proposal for a "permanent peace treaty to end the war completely and negotiations to resume at the same time under the auspices of the international community".

Karadzic said that any extension of the current four-month ceasefire was unacceptable because Bosnian Serbs had realized that their foes were using every respite to regroup their forces, obtain more arms and launch new attacks. The ceasefire agreement between the warring Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, which is to expire on May 1, was negotiated with the mediation of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

### Ganic, Akashi Issue Statements Following Talks

LD2204110995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina  
 Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 22 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the state presidency and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, had talks today with Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy. [Words indistinct] reporting:

[Unidentified correspondent] After one-hour talks in the state presidency building, Yasushi Akashi and Ejup Ganic made statements for the press.

[Akashi in English fading into Serbo-Croatian report] I took the opportunity of my lengthy stay in Sarajevo to have a meeting with Ganic, Yasushi Akashi said. We discussed the current political and military situation, and once again we must raise the issue of a possible cease-fire extension. We also discussed the present situation at Sarajevo Airport, as well as the issues related to the Federation. As you know, Mr. Ganic has just returned from Vienna, where he had a number of meetings on the future of the Federation. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] fully supports the constructive efforts for the best possible cooperation in central Bosnia with regard to the Federation, said Akashi.

[Correspondent] Ejup Ganic said that the talks today were held in difficult conditions, given the situation at

Sarajevo Airport. Karadzic's terrorists are continuing to impose their rules on the UN, Ganic said. The airport and the road to the town are under UN peacekeepers' control, but Karadzic's terrorists are constantly provoking them.

We appeal to the entire civilized world to respond in an adequate fashion to these terrorist actions. We will continue our contacts with Mr. Akashi and concentrate our efforts on finding a solution, such as, for instance, [words indistinct].

As a legitimate government of this state, we will continue our cooperation with the UN and assist the UN in every possible way, Ejup Ganic said at the end of his meeting with Yasushi Akashi.

### Izetbegovic Rejects Cease-Fire Extension

AU2104193595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina  
 Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the state Presidency, today received Yasushi Akashi, the UN Secretary General's special envoy, who informed him about his talks with the representatives of the Pale Serbs. Here is what President Izetbegovic said following the talks:

Karadzic's Serbs have not observed the signed cease-fire on at least three important points: they did not cease the attacks on the Bihac region, they did not open the blue routes, and they did not withdraw from the Srebrenica demilitarized zone. If, as they claim, they really want peace, they can have it. All they need to do is accept the Contact Group peace plan. This plan is not our plan, it is the plan of five superpowers, that is, the international community's plan—and it should support and defend it. We have accepted the plan not because it is a just plan, but simply because it represents the peace option. The plan defines the maximum of our concessions. Everything else calls into question our main objective, the return of the expelled population to their homes. That is why there can be no more concessions on our side, President Izetbegovic said. Before Karadzic's Serbs accept the plan, that is, before Serbia recognizes the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there can be no extension of the cease-fire. We are aware of the risks involved in this decision, but an unconditional extension of the cease-fire—as some factors have suggested—is an even greater risk. Therefore, if fighting resumes the responsibility will clearly lie with the side that has persistently been rejecting a political solution.

President Izetbegovic particularly warned Akashi of the grave situation in Sarajevo, the strangulation of which continues. In this way, he also drew the attention of international officials and the public to this situation. President Izetbegovic asked General Smith to see that the UN Protection Force releases its reports on who is violating the cease-fire in Sarajevo and who is targeting UN soldiers, regardless of who that may be. He was told

that the UN has always done so in cases where the perpetrators can be identified. [passage omitted]

**Karadzic Threatens To Take 'Whole of Sarajevo'**

AU2404072495 Paris AFP in English 0031 GMT 24 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, April 23 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said Sunday [23 April] he had shut Sarajevo Airport at the weekend to show it was under Serb control and threatened to push his troops to seize the city if there was no political solution in Bosnia.

In a special programme on the military situation in Bosnia, shown Sunday night on Serb television, he said he had forced UN envoy Yasushi Akashi and four international diplomats to quit the airport Saturday because "we want them (the world) to understand the Serbs have the right" to open and close the airport. "It is a Serbian airport," he said.

In recent weeks, the Serbs have repeatedly refused permission to the United Nations to fly certain categories of passengers into Sarajevo, controlled in theory by the UN but surrounded on all sides by Serbian or government frontlines and frequently subject to ceasefire violations. [passage omitted]

Karadzic has recently faced some criticism from within the Serb military leadership and appeared keen Sunday to show his determination not to bow to international pressure over the conduct of the war here. The Serb leader rejected out of hand again any chance of accepting the international peace plan for Bosnia upon which the world community has staked its hopes for bringing peace to the bloodied country.

"We will not accept the contact group plan, never, ever," he said. [passage omitted] However the government argues that to extend the ceasefire would simply sanction Serbian control over the 70 percent of land grabbed in 1992 while for the Serbs, Karadzic explained Sunday: "We don't accept a cessation of hostilities while Croats and Moslems are getting more and more arms."

That strengthening of the Moslem-Croat armed forces, military analysts think, is the real reason for the recent pressure on Karadzic, to end the war quickly one way or the other. Suggesting that this was his line too, Karadzic said Sunday: "The war will end, by the political or the military way. We are ready for both," he added.

"If the Moslems don't want a political solution we will take the whole of Sarajevo," he threatened. The best that they, the Moslems, could keep was half a city. "The division of Sarajevo is unavoidable."

"In the past we used to get military victories but never a functioning state. Apart from military victory, we now have the state with all its institutions, which we never had in the past. Our goal is a Serbian republic but within the borders of the whole Serbian nation."

**Karadzic Against UN on Border With Croatia**

LD2404094895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2304 GMT 23 Apr 95

[Item received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Apr (SRNA)—The president of the Srpska republic [RS] [Radovan Karadzic] this evening announced plans to continue the process of unification of the RS and the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] on the basis of the Prijedor Declaration. He also rejected the UN Security Council's Resolution 981 on the deployment of Blue Helmets between western Serb states.

"We told UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] generals clearly and loudly that they would be arrested if they tried to control our borders [kontrolisati]," Dr. Karadzic said. He was taking part in the "In the Defense of the Country" [Na Braniku Otadžbine] program on Bosnian Serb TV.

The RS president said that a session would be held in Knin soon of the recently founded RS and RSK defense council and subsequently of other bodies in charge of cooperation in the areas of economy and information. Speaking about Croat-Serb relations in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Karadzic said that "the Croats will never want to die for the Muslims" but that by supporting Muslim offensives on the RS "they [the Croats] have missed the chance of behaving loyally."

"I would like to know why the Croat republic of Hercegovina allowed itself to be prevailed upon to turn against the Serbs after all that we did to help their civilians during their war with the Muslims. They will have to pay a high price for it when the Muslims decide to settle their territorial accounts in central Bosnia," Dr. Karadzic warned in the "In the Defense of the Country" program on Serb TV this evening.

**Karadzic Wants New 'Objective Mediators'**

LD2404105695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2304 GMT 23 Apr 95

[Item received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Apr (SRNA)—Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Srpska republic [RS] said this evening that the contact group was too incompetent to find a political solution for former Bosnia-Herzegovina and suggested to the international community that they find new, but this time objective mediators.

Speaking in the "In Defense of the Country" program on Bosnian Serb TV, Dr. Karadzic said that the resumption of negotiations was a long way away and that negotiations would be resumed only when the Muslim sponsors in the world realized that nothing can be achieved by using pressure or military methods against the Serbs.

"For this reason we must be ready for both political negotiations and for continuing the war," the RS president said and went on to reiterate that "the Serbs want a lasting peace and not just cessations of hostilities, which merely serve to prolong the war."

#### **Karadzic Assails UNSC Resolution on Sanctions**

*LD2204154195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1406 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Apr (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, has described UN Security Council [UNSC] Resolution 988—which extended the suspension of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by 75 days—as "complete humiliation of the Serb people as a whole."

"This is why we do not recognize such resolutions or the Security Council when it acts in this way. This is why we will close Sarajevo Airport for all political delegations," Karadzic stressed at a press conference in Pale today. He added that the Srpska republic leadership will "reconsider the position" of humanitarian flights.

The Srpska republic president confirmed that "the Contact Group can no longer use Sarajevo Airport to come for talks with the Muslim Government only."

Speaking about the prospects for peace in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Karadzic said that the international community's moves "are very encouraging for the continuation of the war" and stressed that "if the international community wants peace, the Serbs must be given the same treatment as the defeated sides."

"We know that the international community will stop trying to destroy the Serb entity when it realizes what a hard nut the Serbs are. This is why we are advocating the unification of Serb states with immediate effect," Karadzic said. He added that this would confront the world with the choice of either another world war or the recognition of the Serb right to self-determination.

Karadzic believes that "further humiliation and pressures on Serbia and forcing the republic of Serb Krajina to become part of Croatia" could only speed up the process of uniting the Serb lands.

Addressing foreign and domestic journalists, the Srpska republic president suggested that all Serb states "hold a referendum on unification, after which the world will have to accept the fact that the Serbs are one nation and that they want to have one state."

Commenting on reports in the British press that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is ready to recognize the Serb and the Croat-Muslim entities in former Bosnia-Herzegovina—rather than Bosnia-Herzegovina in its AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders—Karadzic said that the Srpska republic would accept even that if the recognition of the

sovereignty of the Croat-Muslim Federation implied the recognition of the Srpska republic's sovereignty.

"The Muslim side is still launching unsuccessful offensives, but our counteroffensive is not very strong because we are trying to give peace a chance before the cease-fire expires," President Karadzic said, summarizing the situation on the battlefield.

The Srpska republic president repeated several times that the Serbs were offering a lasting and stable peace, and not short-term cessations of hostilities. He stressed that the international community and Serb military opponents were forcing the Srpska republic to opt for an end to the war achieved by military means.

"The Serbs do not want to defeat the Muslims completely because that would mean that we have to live together again. Our assembly voted for the separation from the Muslims and the Croats, but whether the Srpska republic opts for a military end to the war depends on the international community's future moves," Karadzic said in conclusion.

#### **Diplomats Leave Sarajevo Under Serb Pressure**

*AU2204135695 Paris AFP in English 1341 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 22 (AFP)—UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi and four Western diplomats left Sarajevo together by plane Saturday [22 April], bowing to threats from Bosnian Serb rebels who had prevented the quartet from entering the city.

The plane with the officials took off at 2:30 p.m. (12:30 GMT) from Sarajevo Airport en route for Zagreb, an AFP correspondent at the airport said. The diplomats, including two representatives of the international Contact Group on former Yugoslavia, were effectively forced out of the city after being stranded at the airport since Friday afternoon, while Akashi said Serb leaders had snubbed his calls for talks to resolve the impasse. The four officials were U.S. and German Contact Group experts Robert Frasure and Michael Steiner, U.S. charge d'affaires John Menzies and U.S. diplomat Jack Zetaku-lie.

Steiner said the group had "come for peace negotiations," adding: "It's not positive for the Bosnian Serbs that we have to leave like this." Lieutenant Colonel Gary Coward, spokesman for General Rupert Smith who heads UN forces here, said the stand-off marked a "watershed" in developments in Bosnia. He added that the Serbs had at the last minute agreed to allow the diplomats into Sarajevo.

But "sadly they attached a number of conditions which were unacceptable to both Mr. Akashi and the diplomats," he said.

The UN official said the Serbs had demanded that the diplomats leave Sarajevo early Saturday evening and agree to meet Bosnian Serb leaders at Serb-held barracks in the city's Lukavica suburb. At 1:50 p.m. (1150 GMT) the Bosnian Serbs "admitted that they had perhaps made a mistake," Coward added.

Akashi earlier Saturday agreed to leave the Bosnian capital for Zagreb with the diplomats after Serbs pressured him to take the quartet out with him, marking the latest in a series of humiliations he has suffered. The envoy, who had tried in vain for two days to get Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government forces to agree to respect and extend a much-violated ceasefire that expires on May 1, said he had been unsuccessful in trying to meet with Serb leaders to resolve the issue.

Forced to postpone his scheduled departure from the city Friday after being threatened if he did not leave with the diplomats, Akashi said he had tried repeatedly through Saturday morning to arrange a meeting with Serb leader Radovan Karadzic or his military chief General Ratko Mladic. But "neither was available." He said Karadzic might have been able to meet later, but added, "I cannot wait that long and the feeling of myself and of the diplomats is that we should go back to Zagreb."

Coward said UN civilian affairs chief Enrique Aguilar was en route Saturday for Pale, the separatist Serbs' mountain stronghold near Sarajevo, to try to see Serb leaders. The crisis blew up when the diplomats arrived at the airport Friday afternoon aboard the UN Yak-40 aircraft that was to have flown Akashi back to Zagreb. The Serbs charged that they had not been consulted over the diplomats' presence on the flight.

The suburb where the airport is located was overflowed Saturday by several planes from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—AA-10 Thunderbolts known as "tankbusters"—that released heat flares to divert possible missiles. Standoffs between the Serbs besieging Sarajevo and UN and international officials have intensified recently.

Last week, the Serbs refused permission to the then US ambassador to Bosnia Victor Jackovic to leave Sarajevo by UN plane, forcing him to get out of the city via a treacherous mountain road, and prompting official U.S. protests. Separately Saturday an 82 mm shell slammed into an indoor market in central Sarajevo, causing some damage but no injuries, an AFP photographer said.

UN spokesman Major Pierre Chavancy said a 53-year-old man had been killed by sniper fire in a western area of the city on Friday. Five other people had been wounded in other incidents. Addressing a meeting in Sarajevo Saturday morning, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic referred to the treatment of the diplomats by the Serbs and said: "What has been done to them is nasty, but I think it is also useful."

"If we see each other (again), they may acknowledge that during the last night they learned more about what has

happened here than in the last three years," he added. "They had all night to think about where the concessions and appeasements to the Serbs have led them."

#### RS State Committee Issues Statement on Airport

LD2204145295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1320 GMT 22 Apr 95

[Item received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Apr (SRNA)—The state committee of the Srpska republic [RS] for cooperation with the UN and with international organizations issued a statement today in connection with the AFP report carried at 1010 on 22 April. SRNA has the text of the statement:

1. At a meeting between UN civilian and military representatives on one side and representatives of the RS state committee for cooperation with the United Nations and with international humanitarian organizations (RS Vice President Nikola Koljevic and Momcilo Mandic attending) on the other, it was agreed to allow the safe landing at Sarajevo airport of the plane carrying the UN military and civilian personnel from Zagreb at 1430 on 21 April.

2. It was also agreed to urgently discuss the issue of granting a written guarantee for humanitarian flights on the Ancona-Sarajevo route. Likewise, agreement was reached to examine all controversial issues regarding the use and abuse of Sarajevo Airport at 1200 on 26 April.

3. The above-mentioned aircraft arriving from Zagreb was allowed to land safely, but without any previous announcement four West diplomats appeared at Sarajevo Airport, which is contrary to the agreement of 31 January 1995.

4. During the course of the afternoon of 21 April, after the arrival of the unannounced persons, UN representatives were told by RS liaison officers that His Excellency Yasushi Akashi, as well as all military and civilian representatives accompanying him, were free to take the same route back—according to the agreement. The RS state committee asked for an on-the-spot approval of the unannounced arrival and visit of the above Western diplomats. The UN civilian sector failed to respond to this request in keeping with the agreed procedure before 1230 on 22 April.

5. Consequently, we are categorically stating that the AFP allegations that the UN special envoy, His Excellency Yasushi Akashi, was forced to stay the night at Sarajevo Airport are untrue, as is the allegation that the Serb side made the flight of his excellency conditional on the departure of the West diplomats.

"We are deeply convinced that such dishonoring of the existing agreements and established procedures, as well as the false agency reports, could seriously jeopardize

any positive move in the direction of a peaceful settlement," it is said in the conclusion of the statement by the RS state committee for cooperation with the United Nations, submitted to SRNA.

#### **UNPROFOR: Impact of War Crimes Decision**

*AU2404113395 Paris AFP in English 1031 GMT 24 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 24 (AFP)—The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia Monday expressed concern about the possible impact on the fragile peace process of the naming of Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic as suspected war criminals.

UNPROFOR spokesman Alexander Ivanko said UNPROFOR "hopes it (the naming) will not negatively affect negotiations" over the extension of a ceasefire due to run out here at the end of the month. The International Criminal Tribunal based in The Hague on Monday said it was investigating Karadzic and General Mladic, the head of the Bosnian Serb army, on suspicion of war crimes.

"It's not for us to assess the timing," Ivanko told a press briefing in Sarajevo, but "we have to hope that this will not affect the peace process." Ivanko rejected suggestions that the decision to name the two would force UNPROFOR to reconsider its current policy of seeking to negotiate with rather than confront the accused Bosnian Serbs.

"We will continue working with the Bosnian Serb leadership as leaders of one of the factions to the fighting here," he said.

#### **Presidency Decides To Form Reserve Army Units**

*AU2104113295 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 17 Apr 95 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Strengthening Defense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Examining the military and economic situation at its 280th session, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted the Decision on Forming Reserve Units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

These units will be formed on the production and territorial principle and will include military draftees assigned on the basis of a work order, unassigned draftees, and volunteers irrespective of their sex or age.

The goal of the decision is to strengthen the country's defense and to coordinate it with the needs of production under the war conditions. Among other things, the decision will accomplish a more even distribution of defense and production tasks to all Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens, regardless of whether they are in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army or are included in the process of production on the basis of a work order.

**RSK Official Criticizes UN Resolution 981**

*LD2204122595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1134 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 21 Apr (SRNA)—Slobodan Jarcevic, foreign affairs adviser to Milan Martić, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], today said that the people, army, and authorities of Krajina will not allow the implementation of those points of UN Security Council Resolution 981 which deny and ignore the RSK's sovereignty.

Jarcevic pointed out to SRNA some wrong interpretations of the agreement on opening the Zagreb-Lipovac Freeway, and announced that the RSK Government would pass a decision to completely close the section of the freeway which goes through western Slavonia if the international community continues to impose unacceptable solutions.

President Martić's adviser recalled the letter sent by the cochairmen of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia to Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelić, which specifies that the freeway will be closed to the transport of goods and passengers between the RSK, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Bosnian Srpska republic, while the Croatian authorities reserve the right to let through some traffic.

Jarcevic believes that the attempt to replace the UN observers on the RSK's borders with EU personnel is another unacceptable solution. Speaking about the possibility of Croatia launching an attack on the Spska republic and the RSK, Jarcevic stressed that the Serb people "will mount competent resistance, and Croatia will probably not be able to retain its current territory."

**UN To Reduce Troops in Croatia, Krajina**

*LD2104185295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1818 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Knin, Serb Krajina, April 21 (TANJUG)—The U.N. force in Serb Krajina and Croatia will be cut by one-third, a U.N. spokesman said Friday.

Alun Roberts, spokesman for U.N.-protected sector south based in the Serb Krajina capital of Knin, said at a regular press briefing that the renamed U.N. force—the U.N. Confidence Restoration Operation [in Croatia] (UNCRO)—would be 8,750 strong.

Roberts said he still did not have information about what was in U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali's report on the new force in Croatia and Serb Krajina. The report should be submitted to the U.N. Security Council later today.

Security Council Resolution 981 extended the mandate of the renamed force in Croatia and Serb Krajina until late November, and the council is to define the force's size, duties and deployment by end April in a separate

resolution. Roberts quoted U.N. mediator in the former Yugoslavia Thorvald Stoltenberg as saying he had not obtained Knin's and Zagreb's support for the plan for the new mandate and deployment of U.N. troops, and that the only alternative was the troops' withdrawal and war.

The war between Croatia and Serb Krajina broke out in 1991 after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia, prompting local Serbs set up the republic of Serb Krajina, which was placed under U.N. protection in the spring of 1992. Roberts said that, under the new plan, U.N. troops should monitor the border between Croatia and Serb Krajina at check-points and observation posts and especially in places where there was a high risk of incidents breaking out. He said the U.N. force command in Zagreb would be determining where troops should be deployed.

Roberts said that, for the first time, the U.N. force would be in charge also of protecting human rights, both individual and collective, at the request of both Croats and Krajina Serbs. He warned of a stepped-up presence of Croatian and Bosnian Croat troops in the Dinara mountain range southeast of Knin.

**Knin Said Expecting Help From Vucurevic**

*AU2104162595 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 95 p 3*

[Article by Fran Visnar: "Knin Relies on Vucurevic"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Following the latest Croatian military success at Mt. Dinara, Knin found itself stuck between the units of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the HV [Croatian Army]. Since the dominating Dinara heights were taken, Knin has been only 17 km away and within reach of the Croatian heavy artillery. All Croatian guns and howitzers with calibers of over 100-mm can precisely hit targets not only in Knin, but in its entire vicinity. Even if the Croats do not bring heavy artillery into the hills, from the occupied heights they can guide all shelling from land and air in that belt. The Knin rebels therefore have a lot of reasons to panic. Step by step, over months, the HVO and the elite HV units had been devising this undoubtedly important military breakthrough. Only one step, that is, the actual closing, has remained for the pincers to close completely—finally cutting off the Knin-Bosansko Grahovo road. At that moment, if we use chess terms, the queen falls and the king is threatened with checkmate in two moves: The HV gets to its international borders and, by its very physical presence on Mt. Dinara, weakens the position of the Knin rulers.

**Surprised Serbs**

Through the combination of a measured use of firepower and shrewdness, using comparatively small forces and resources, and without major international clamor and its own losses, the Croatian side has achieved great results. The joint activity of the HV and the HVO

functions perfectly. The joint headquarters, equal armament, unified equipment, and exceptional moral and physical readiness have completely taken the Serbs by surprise. This combined mountain enterprise was completely unexpected by them. In these regions, they would rather be expecting flying saucers to land than to see a joint strike by Croatian infantry and artillery.

In the valley several kilometers away from Knin, HV commando troops have long ago started several secret and covert operations. Incursions behind enemy lines and infiltrating the Serbian defense units is a skill that was exercised from 1992 to 1994. With disbelief, Serb political and military leaders in Knin have discovered deep in the territory that they control an underground stockpile of light and subversive arms that they believe originate from the HV.

What is one to say to that? If it is true, then the level of training of the Croatian professional units is such that they can scatter everywhere, even within the so-called "Krajina," such small supply pockets and underground storages that can be used in large-scale assaults and resolute battles as welcome ancillary bases and secret retreats. Even if they turned into hunting dogs, the Knin people cannot sniff out all Croatian hiding places and as for the one discovered, it was probably a deliberate sacrifice made with a view to publicizing the quality of the Croatian special forces and increasing pressure on the so-called Krajina.

#### Vucurovic's Illusion

Facing the above situation, Knin people see their only salvation in [Trebinje Mayor] Vucurovic. It is therefore not coincidental that after every Croatian military success on Mt. Dinara, fire is opened from Trebinje on Dubrovnik, the Cilipe airport, and the Dubrovnik coast. [passage omitted]

#### Serb Krajina Closes Down Main Motorway

LD2404081195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0731 GMT 24 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Okucani, 24 Apr (TANJUG)—Following President Milan Martić's decision, this morning at 0600 [0400 GMT] members of the militia of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] closed the western Slavonia section of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway to all traffic.

All of the vehicles between Paklenica and Dragalic were allowed to proceed. They have left the territory of the RSK without incident. Throughout this operation UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] members kept a low profile.

According to the decision of the RSK president, the motorway will be closed for 24 hours, until 0600, 25 April. Martić's explanation is that the motorway has been closed down as a warning and protest over the fact that the Croatian side has been using it unilaterally,

whereas, as far as the RSK's needs are concerned, the motorway has been used as a vehicle for pressure and blackmail, which is not in the spirit of the economic agreement signed with Croatia.

#### Granic Urges More Pressure on Belgrade

AU2404082795 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 15-17 Apr 95 pp 16-17

[Interview with Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Mate Piskor in Zagreb; date not given: "Foreign Minister Granic: 'Croatia Has Left a Vicious Circle of War and Trouble'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic is a tireless traveler struggling for the well-being of Croatia and its proper role within the international community. The enthusiasm with which he has fought for Croatian interests and the persistence with which he has succeeded in opening many doors for Croatia at centers of power not always particularly fond of Croatia have fascinated the world. The topics of this conversation, held at the deputy prime minister's office in Zagreb, were Resolution 981, the diplomatic battles to come, Croatia's relations with her neighbors, and the return of the refugees. [passage omitted]

[Piskor] One of the points of Resolution 981 is the implementation of the economic agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the rebel Serbs' leadership. How do you comment on the latest decision of the self-appointed Okucani municipality to call off the renovation of the railroad through the occupied area of Western Slavonia?

[Granic] It must be made clear that the gap between those rebel Serbs in the occupied territories who support negotiations and those who sharply oppose them, in other words those who sharply oppose the implementation of the economic agreement, Resolution 981, and the control [kontrola] of Croatia's borders, is widening.

[Piskor] Which group is bigger and more powerful, and which will prevail?

[Granic] Time will show which is stronger and events will unfold accordingly. Croatia will draw its conclusions from what is going on the ground. In any case, the increasing conflict among the rebel Serbs is obvious, which can be regarded as the achievement of one of the Resolution's aims, but the final result will depend on Belgrade's decision.

[Piskor] Has the Contact Group perhaps brought some news about this from Belgrade?

[Granic] Belgrade has not yet presented its attitude in public, but the Serbian media are minimizing the importance of Resolution 981, which could mean that they are not going to reject it. Belgrade has to be given credit for both the acceptance and implementation of the Resolution, because Belgrade has the greatest influence on the

leadership of the rebel Serbs in Croatia. Belgrade army officers are in [Serb-occupied] Croatia and I have informed the UN secretary general about it. There are 6,000 soldiers, five generals, 50 colonels who are members of the General Staff, and almost 200 senior officers, all of whom account for more than a half of the total number of rebel Serb officers. This definitely shows that Belgrade is involved in the events on Croatian territory.

It must be pointed out that at least 200,000 people live in the occupied Croatian territories, around 185,000 Serbs and approximately 8,000 Croats and non-Serbs. They live in poverty, they are out of work, without any income, and are living on humanitarian aid. According to some estimates, 77 percent of the working population is employed with the UN and peacekeepers. Naturally, the Serbs in the occupied territories, who control 23.5 percent of Croatia, have so far survived only thanks to Belgrade's support. That is why Croatia has demanded that the international community does everything that it can to start the control [kontrola] of the Croatian borders with Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would cut off the supplies for the rebel Serbs and make it clear to Belgrade that it cannot interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia.

[Piskor] Are the very serious accusations of Milosevic and his policy by Foreign Ministers Kinkel and Juppe an announcement of the beginning of the end of Milosevic's expansionist policy, as Juppe has never criticized Milosevic as openly as now?

[Granic] It is all still not enough, because Belgrade has effectively not yet given up. It is not yet ready to recognize Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; it is only ready to recognize a future union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means that it has only appeared to be giving way, because in return it is demanding that it is recognized as the successor to the former Yugoslavia and that sanctions imposed on it are lifted. Milosevic could do much more for peace by recognizing Croatia within its internationally recognized borders and initiating a process of normalizing relations with Croatia. Even if Belgrade recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, this would not mean peace, because Karadzic does not recognize any plan by the international community and, apart from that, he is competing with Milosevic for influence and the leading position among the Serbs. I would like to mention another example. On Wednesday [12 April], Karadzic again refused to let Contact Group members visit Sarajevo. If the great powers allow such a humiliation, it is quite certain that the pressure on Belgrade is still not great enough.

[Piskor] How do the effects of Resolution 981 impact on Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Granic] The situation is like this: Martic and the radical wing are rejecting the resolution and trying to develop links as close as possible to Karadzic with the basic aim to avoid the control [kontrola] of the borders. This is one

level of the problem. At another level is the fact that neither the Muslim nor the Serbian side wants to extend the cease-fire period for various reasons. To put it more simply, as far as the unfolding of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, I have to admit openly that the chances of peace are not great. We must consider various scenarios, even that the conflict might spread. Consequently, it is also doubtful whether the UN Protection Force will remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Naturally, it would then be possible for the conflict to spread beyond the region, which would mean that Croatia would have to be particularly careful.

[Piskor] You say that the chances of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not good, but what are the prospects for relations between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is for their Federation?

[Granic] The Federation is in any case the best option for the survival of both the Croatian and the Muslim populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are, however, not happy about the speed with which the Washington and Vienna Agreements are being implemented. We are not pleased because it is clear that the Federation has to be urgently established and that its institutions have to be strengthened, at the expense of all other structures. The Federation cannot be inferior to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, except for those of its elements defined in the transitional stipulations of the Vienna Agreement. Only the strengthening of the Federation and the weakening of the powers of the institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina can create the process in which Herceg-Bosna would die, so that the Federation would also be the most powerful guarantor in negotiations with the third, the Serbian side, the most powerful guarantor of the existence of the Croats and Muslims. [passage omitted]

[Piskor] During the meeting with your Slovene counterpart Zoran Thaler this week, you pointed out that the key task for Croatian foreign policy after the reintegration of the occupied territories would be the development of friendly relations with neighboring countries. What are these relations like now?

[Granic] We have good relations with almost all our neighbors in the region. I mean Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, and naturally, our direct neighbors Slovenia, Italy, and Hungary. With Hungary we have recently signed an agreement on the protection of minorities that is of great importance, because it is a very good agreement. It will be highly regarded at the European Council. An agreement on the protection of minorities will soon be signed with the Republic of Italy too, as well as further agreements on friendship and cooperation, on the protection of investment, and other important agreements.

Regarding relations with Slovenia, there are several controversial issues that have resulted from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. These involve the

definition of borders and some property issues. As far as the borders are concerned, it must be mentioned that 77 percent of the border is undisputed, while a further 10 percent is only questionable in terms of minor deviations of a few to several hundred meters, which can be solved at the level of experts. Ultimately, there remains 4 kilometers of the controversial land and sea border in the Piran Bay that will have to be solved by the politicians. Progress has been achieved regarding property issues, such as the Krsko nuclear power station and Ljubljanska Banka. It has to be pointed out that we have been working, negotiating, and making agreements in a good atmosphere, an atmosphere of respect and understanding, so that results will be achieved here, too.

We must sort out our relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina and ultimately normalize relations with Belgrade, which will depend on Serbia's recognition of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders.

[Box, p 17]

#### A Negative Signal to Croats

[Piskor] How do you comment on the certain rapprochement between Sarajevo and Belgrade, in the light of the negotiations of President Izetbegovic, or rather his envoy, Mr. Filipovic, with Milosevic?

[Granic] Negotiations whose aim is the achievement of peace are positive. On the other hand, the mutual recognition of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that involved further concessions, such as a confederal association of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, would certainly put the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina in an unfavorable position. We think that the mutual recognition of all states is the only way out of the crisis, but we also think that the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, without the strengthening of the Federation, is a negative signal to the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But if it is followed by the strengthening of the Federation, this recognition can be considered a positive process.

#### General Views UNCRO, Croat-Muslim Relations

AU2404093295 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian  
15-17 Apr 95 pp 2-3

[Interview with General Janko Bobetko, chief of General Staff of the Croatian Army, by Branko Podgornik; place and date not given: "We Have To Preserve the Dignity of Those Who Have Sacrificed Their Lives for Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

#### I Do Not Want To Make Any Predictions

[Podgornik] Is it possible for the war in Croatia to start again if the Croatian Serbs refuse to accept the UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] or political negotiations with Croatian authorities?

[Bobetko] To speak on that one can only make good or bad predictions. Realistically speaking, Croatia does not decide many things. The UN Security Council has the task of operationally implementing Resolution 981. One of the basic elements to stopping the war is to prevent the aggressor from continuing the destruction. This is no longer so much a Croatian decision, but one the big powers and the UN Security Council will make.

Resolution 981 shows that the role and organization of the international forces have to be changed, so that not only their name but also the content of their work is changed, which is important. The UN Protection Force has acted indecisively, in an unsure way, and has not been respected. You can see that Serbs can do with the UN Protection Force whatever they want, so that it depends on the mood of certain individuals or barbarians whether they allow the passage of humanitarian convoys, or whether someone will be killed or not.

Whether international forces in Croatia are given a new role, as has been proposed by Croatia, we shall see after April 21, when the UN Security Council has to pass the working resolution. If the control [kontrola] of Croatian, internationally recognized borders is not granted, we shall have to acknowledge that international factors still respect Serbian aggression—which is, I would like to remark, still ongoing. The Serbs have not given up aggression, on the contrary their attacks against the civilian population have become more cruel; they destroy houses, they have resumed the same methods in a worse form.

If the UN Security Council compromises itself, there is no other institution that could justly stop the negative events from unfolding. That is why I say that I do not want to make either good or bad predictions. I have my own opinion about everything, but I do not want to express it now.

In any case, if the UN Security Council passes a positive decision for Croatia after 21 April, the prospects for realizing a general strategy for a peaceful solution will open up for Croatia.

In other words, our situation will be considerably clearer after the operational resolution has been passed by the UN Security Council, although it need not be decisive.

[Podgornik] What should Croatia do then? Which option should it choose and what course should it take?

[Bobetko] These are important questions, and time and arguments are necessary to be able to give an answer to them. It is a matter of assessment what will happen if, for example, we are confronted with open conflict. If it does not come to implementing Resolution 981, Croatia must be well prepared and organized.

As we can see, our friends in the world are very cautious and far from firmly supporting us. The situation makes it necessary for us to assess the possible unfolding of events not only in Croatia but also in the broader area.

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The unfolding of events will soon show in which direction things are progressing and the attitude we shall have to assume. We should not make a wrong step now that could make it easy for the UN Security Council or the Serbs to get out of the present situation. We cannot begin any operation that the other side might interpret as provocation.

[Podgornik] How do you interpret, for example, the fact that Serbian forces intensely attacked Konavle on Thursday [13 April]?

[Bobetko] These are provocations. We must not allow ourselves to be taken in by their provocations. We have to define a firm direction in order to avoid being led astray. It could not be concluded on the basis of our behavior so far that we have not given others a chance. We have agreed, and others have to make their decisions now, because they are responsible for their implementation. If they cheat now, it will be clear that we cannot expect anything from international powers and that we have to be prepared to solve our problems ourselves.

In their latest association conference, Croatian refugees expressed very serious warnings. It must be realized that for psychological reasons, these people cannot reconcile themselves to their very difficult fate. Some of them are patient, but the impatience of those who want to return home must be understood too.

#### **The Scheme Will Either Be Crushed or Not!**

[Podgornik] Is there a danger that the war that could break out in Bosnia because of Karadzic's refusal of the Contact Group plan may spread to Croatia also?

[Bobetko] This is not only about Karadzic. It is about whether a particular scheme will finally be crushed or not. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are the basic impediments to the materialization of the horrible plan for the achievement of a Greater Serbia. It is not easy to say what the response to the plan for a Greater Serbia. The answer depends on Serbian economic and human potential, on whether they can endure a long-lasting war or not. The answer also depends on who supports the Serbs, whose interests they defend by trying to materialize the plan for the establishment of a Greater Serbia.

The Serbs are now surprised by the more powerful and better organized Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, since it has started to launch serious attacks against the Serbs over a broad area. Serbia has so far disassociated itself from events in Bosnia-Herzegovina by claiming that this is a matter of the so-called Serbian "creation" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Karadzic's idea, but it is a fact that the main strings are pulled from Belgrade. The strategy, commanders, advice, assessments, and proposals on how to behave come from Serbia.

The question is, in other words, whether Serbia will decide to play with the joker if it assesses that it is not able to keep the "stranglehold" it has on Bosnia, since

the other side, which has become stronger in the meantime, can return the occupied territories. Serbia might in that case decide to enter this war adventure with all of its reserves with the aim of gaining at least a part of Bosnia, in order to be able to claim that it has not lost the war and that that territory will satisfy Serbian interests for a while.

This is one of the solutions, and it will soon be seen whether it is possible. Serbia is trying to maintain its alliances, with Greece, for example. This is the country that principally breaks the international blockade of Serbia, by supplying it with fuel and other commodities. If Greece had not taken this attitude, the economic blockade of Serbia and Montenegro would be much more efficient.

[Podgornik] How probable is it for Serbia to start spreading the conflict?

[Bobetko] It is not very probable that Serbia wants the conflict to spread now, although this possibility cannot be totally excluded. Serbs have had negative experiences and big losses in military operations so far, and, apart from that, the situation has changed considerably, so that I doubt that the Serbs could decide to reshuffle their forces now—even more so because they do not have enough soldiers anyway—and start their actions as they did in 1991.

This issue has become current again recently, however, this possibility is not completely discounted because the revival of the front in the Muslim enclaves of Gorazde and Srebrenica shows that some of the forces from Serbia could start heading in that direction. If we take a look at the geographic map, we can see that the Serbian forces could move to the rear of Muslim forces in the direction of Tuzla, where they would—by intersecting this area—enable Serbia to cross the Drina River and occupy large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbs could reach the assessment that unless they do so, they will have finally lost the war and have to return to the other bank of the Drina River. I do not think they are quite ready for such an action yet because this would be acknowledging that their strategy was defeated. They still exhibit a tendency to be aggressive. A war encounter like this is not very probable, but it must not be completely discounted.

#### **The Washington Agreement Is Decisive**

[Podgornik] Can Croatian-Muslim cooperation prevent Serbia from crossing the Drina River?

[Bobetko] The Washington Agreement is not pure coincidence. This is an important strategic aim that would solve two basic problems: Avoiding any possible conflict between Croats and Muslims, and being able to quickly defeat the aggressor in mutual actions. The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is in other words one of the factors that enables the stability of Croatia in this area. It is the only chance for Bosnia-Herzegovina to partially keep its independence and to return Serbia to its starting positions.

Croatia should in no case, not even theoretically, allow an intelligence service to initiate conflicts between Muslims and Croats. I think that there are political and military powers in Serbia that would immediately make use of that conflict to the detriment of both sides, primarily the Croatian, since from the political and military point of view, and as an ally of the Bosnian Croats, Croatia bothers Serbia.

No matter how difficult the implementation of the Washington Agreement is, regardless of side blows or a lack of understanding from extremists, I would like to point out that the person who made these agreements had a far-reaching and clear vision of the direction in which events can realistically unfold. Regardless of the attitude the Muslim and Croatian Governments take toward these agreements, they cannot be avoided. The Federation is a historic shield for both the Croats and Muslims.

It is a Croatian strategic interest to avoid internal rifts that might result in conflict between Croats and Muslims, as this would signify political defeat. It must be borne in mind that many leading Muslim politicians must dispel some misinterpretations of their interests, because they cannot always be right. There must be no divergencies among them, they have to decide to firmly cooperate with Croatia. The Serbs can only profit from the lack of cooperation between Croats and Muslims. [passage omitted]

#### **Paper Predicts Opposition Election Victory**

*AU2104160795 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 21 Apr 95 pp 4-5, 58*

[Article by Davor Butkovic: "The Grand Coalition of the HSLs, HSS, HND, and HNS Will Get at Least 50 Percent of Votes at Parliamentary Elections and Topple the HDZ From Power!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] If the Croatian Peasant's Party [HSS] does not enter into coalition with the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], the HDZ will lose the next parliamentary elections. At least, this is what is shown by adding up the votes given to the parliamentary parties in the opinion polls conducted by GLOBUS and some other media in the past year.

For more than a year, since April 1994 (when the parliamentary crisis reached its culmination), the largest opposition party the HSLs [Croatian Social Liberal Party] has been receiving between 25 and 32 or 33 percent support.

The HSS has been getting between 6 and 8 percent, but it realistically strives for much more, which is confirmed by the fact that at the county and local elections in 1993 it received 11.8 percent of the vote despite not having put forward candidates in more than 40 electoral units. The disproportion between the HSS's real power, as well as its popularity, and the results in the polls is the

consequence of the specific, rural, structure of its potential voters. This stratum of the population is not sufficiently represented in the polls.

It is quite clear, however, that the HSLs and the HSS cannot jointly get less than 40 percent of the vote at this moment. One should add to this the usual 5 to 6 percent of the votes for the Croatian Independent Democrats [HND], and a few percentages for the Croatian People's Party [HNS].

#### **Dispersion of Votes**

According to the results obtained from polls, the four Croatian parties of the center, which have already reached an agreement on a grand preelection coalition, should therefore win at least one half of all votes at the next elections, which means that in the next 12 months, possibly 18 months, there will most probably be a change of authorities!

The HDZ has not had more than 40 percent support at any time in the past year in any serious poll. Most frequently it had 30 percent support. [passage omitted]

#### **Valentic To Remain Prime Minister Until Election**

*LD2204170195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The executive board of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] has held its 24th session in Zagreb. It discussed a number of issues relating to the party's work. Nikica Valentic, prime minister, will lead the government until the next regular parliament elections scheduled for next year. The board was also informed that Mirko Madjor, an independent deputy, has joined the HDZ. He was the deputy chairman of the Croatian Peasants' Party.

The board was also informed about the fact that in Zagreb and some other towns groups of distinguished citizens are joining the HDZ. Some other deputies, who oppose attempts to destabilize Croatia, have also announced their intention to join the HDZ. [passage omitted]

#### **Stoltenberg Arrives in Knin for Talks**

*LD2404144495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1407 GMT 24 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 24 Apr (TANJUG)—Thorwald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, arrived in Knin this afternoon. Minutes after his arrival he met with the top state leadership of the Republic of Serb Krajina headed by President Milan Martić.

Today's talks with Stoltenberg, the second round in the past seven days, will focus on implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 981 and 988, Borislav

Mikelic, president of the Krajina government, told TANJUG. Other issues, including a blockade of convoys carrying fuel and goods for Krajina on the highway near Lipovac, will also be discussed.

In addition to Martic and Mikelic Krajina's delegation also includes Minister for Foreign Affairs Milan Babic.

**Unions Call General Strike for 27 Apr**

*LD2104174795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 21 Apr (TANJUG)—The confederation of independent trade unions in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] has called a general strike, under the slogan "The voice of the hungry," for 27 April.

The leading nationalist opposition, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity [VMRO-DPMNE], which announced that it will make several political demands at the central strike meeting, has given its support to the strike organizers.

VMRO-DPMNE leader Ljupce Georgijevski told journalists that his party will make the following demands: "the resignation of the current government and the formation of a government of technocrats, fresh elections and self-dissolution [samo-raspustanje] of the current parliament."

The reason for the opposition demands is privatization of three successful state-owned enterprises: The Skopje brewery, Fersped, and Makedonijaturist.

**Police Close Down Albanian School in Struge**

*AU2204132995 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[Report by Imer Ismajli from Struge]

[FBIS Translated Text] The only Albanian private high school in Macedonia [The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], the Hajdar Dushi school in Ladorisht in Struge, was closed down by Macedonian police forces and remains under continuing police authority.

The entrance to Ladorisht village in Struge is being controlled by police forces, and those who are not village residents are not allowed to enter.

Pupils in the Hajdar Dushi High School attend their school every day. However, the majority are turned back by the police, the only reason being that they were not born in Ladorisht.

In a statement, both branches of the Popular Democratic Party and the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia demanded the evacuation of police forces from the school and that high school classes continue without interruption.

The high school's teaching council denounced the police violence and demanded that classes resume immediately. The council stressed that it is necessary to continue talks with the Skopje official authorities, so that the Hajdar Dushi high school becomes part of the republic's education system.

More police forces than usual have been observed recently in Struge and the surrounding area.

**Albanian Activist Halili To Go on Trial 8 May**

*AU2204133095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[Report by Imer Ismajli from Struge]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Tetovo Communal Court announced that the trial of Nevzat Halili, chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, the party for popular unity, is to be held on 8 May. Halili is charged with having prevented the official authority from carrying out its duty. In fact, Halili directly committed himself to the functioning of the Tetovo University and participated in the rally on 17 February, the day classes started at the Tetovo University and the Macedonian police violently intervened to stop them.

It is also reported that two deputies of the Popular Democratic Party, Meshtel Bilali and Abdyladi Veseli, proclaimed themselves independent deputies, which was received by the public here with the dilemma of whether another Albanian party of Albanians in Macedonia will be split and who is behind these splits.

**PDP Expands Name To Reflect 'Albanian Identity'**

*AU2304134295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[Statement by Arber Xhaferi, chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia, on 22 April via telephone from Skopje—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a meeting held today, the central assembly of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] decided that from now on, the party will be called the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] of Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. As you were informed several days ago, the party was registered in the Skopje District Court. After the meeting was over today, we got the following statement via telephone from the party chairman Arber Xhaferri:

[Begin Xhaferri recording] It was a PDP regular assembly that was permeated by an atmosphere of work, but at the same time by a solemn spirit, as the meeting discussed the main lines of the party's policy, and the successes of this line in internationalizing the Albanian question in Macedonia. The meeting also had a solemn dimension, as the assembly decided that from now on the PDP will have an Albanian identity. We think that with this, we will definitively put an end to confusions that were imposed on the Albanian political subject by various circles in Macedonia.

The assembly stressed that we should not dare to forget why we have been formed as a political party and what

we should express as a political party. We should also not forget the contributions of previous generations and various activists who have currently left the ranks of political parties, activists of the PDP or other political parties who have made their contribution to the Albanian issue in Macedonia.

We also assessed today that the Albanian question is an acute issue in international circles, and that the process of internationalizing our cause has made some progress.

However, we had reports from international institutions today that speak of the position of Albanians in Macedonia, while a year ago it was thought that Macedonia was an oasis of peace where different nations and cultures coexist in happiness. However, the reports by international factors reveal that this peace is false, and that problems should be resolved here. There are others who propose to change the constitution, just like Mr. Ahrens.

#### New Party Registers

*LD2304140095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1221 GMT 23 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 23 Apr (TANJUG)—Supporters of the radical "Homeland" splinter faction of the Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] have convened a central assembly in Tetovo to promote their new party led by Arben Dzaferi, TANJUG has learned.

The new "Party of Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia" has submitted its application to the District Court in Skopje with the signatures of 539 founding members. On the strength of this it was registered on 18 April as the third Albanian party in Macedonia. [passage omitted]

**Jansa: Illegal-Arms Charges Part of LDS Purge**  
*AU2004115195 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Janez Jansa, president of the Social Democratic Party and former defense minister, claims that the political background of the affair with Brnik arms cargo and with the charges pressed against him and Former Interior Minister Igor Bavcar is a part of purges within the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS]. The charges against Peter Tancig have been followed by charges against Igor Bavcar and supposedly others will follow, too. Gojko Brvar reports from a news conference at which the party aired protest because the State Administration for Youth did not allocate any funds to the Young Social Democrats and its views on the resolution of the situation in Dolga Vas:

[Begin recording] [Brvar] Janez Jansa claims he vocally demanded the investigation of the Brnik arms cache from the Interior Minister on several occasions in spring 1992, and in writing on 12 May. The final results of the investigation, which has shown that Minister Bavcar was not the one who authorized the import of arms, are not known to this very date. Because the arms could not enter the country bypassing the Interior Ministry services guarding the border, the question is who, apart from Bavcar, also had the authority to open the border for this cargo. According to Jansa, they should be sought among the Interior Ministry state secretaries of the time. He singled out special police force commander Vinko Beznik.

Had the investigation of the Brnik arms cargo identified those responsible, Jansa said, there would be no Maribor arms affair.

[Jansa] My information suggests that the process against the people in Maribor stopped directly at the instruction of the prime minister. There is no reason not to believe that even the present charges had previously been approved by the prime minister. I am firmly convinced of this.

[Brvar] Jansa concurs with Bavcar that the opening of the Brnik arm affair is an attempt to attach criminal connotations to the entire process of the Slovene independence. He reproached his former friend for failing to notice that the entire affair was triggered by his fellow LDS party member—current Defense Minister Jelko Kacin.

Janez Jansa also presented some of the facts about the arms. The Slovene state ordered antiaircraft rockets from a supplier, however, the latter refused to deliver them until the police paid for other goods—the goods which Igor Bavcar claims he had not ordered.

[Jansa] Our ministry was then compelled to issue a permit for the export of these arms from the country and, in this way, allowed the Ministry of Internal Affairs to settle its debt toward the supplier. Only then did the supplier release a shipment of antiaircraft rockets. [passage omitted]

[Brvar] Whatever, somebody with authority ordered the arms, otherwise the cargo could not have entered the country. There are no indications that this would be Igor Bavcar, which means that the key people are missing from the indictment. [end recording]

**Agent Implicated in Arms Affair Joins SOVA**

*AU2304171895 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 19 Apr 95 p 2*

[Article by "V.V.": "Silvo Komar New Assistant Director of SOVA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 18 April—Among the surprising cadre changes that the government made at its last session without a debate is doubtlessly the appointment of 45-year-old attorney Silvo Komar to the post of assistant to Drago Fers, director of the Security-Intelligence Agency SOVA. Bearing in mind the importance of the post this appointment must have almost certainly been coordinated within the coalition. Silvo Komar was appointed on Thursday [13 April] and on Friday the Crime Department forwarded charges against former ministers Janez Jansa and Igor Bavcar to Koper.

From May 1991 until the discovery of the arms at Maribor airport, Silvo Komar was the commander of the operative district of the Security Information Service [VIS] in Maribor. On 22 July, upon the discovery of the arms at the airport, the defense minister at the time Janez Jansa singled out Silvo Komar as the owner of the arms that were allegedly intended for the preparation of a coup d'etat.

Argumentation of the nomination of Komar, who has since independence in May 1991 been VIS commander and head of the coordination group for east Styria, is not known.

### Federal

#### Ambassador to UN Views Latest Vote on Sanctions

*AU2204164895 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Immediately after the end of the UN Security Council session last night at which, let us emphasize, a U.S. version of the resolution on suspension of sanctions in culture, sports, and public transport was passed, Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, Yugoslav representative to the UN in New York, gave an interview to Radio Belgrade, to our reporter Dragan Colovic. For technical reasons, due to poor telephone lines, this interview is read out by speaker Dragana Kautski:

Commenting on the latest UN Security Council Resolution No. 988 on further suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], Ambassador Djokic said that this resolution came as a result of very powerful pressures on the Contact Group members, primarily by the United States. There was a lot of opposition to such a resolution among the members of the UN Security Council, especially regarding new conditions and a reduction in the duration of the eased sanctions, Ambassador Djokic said. However, thanks to powerful pressure by the United States, the members of the Contact Group with the exception of Russia, which distanced itself from such efforts, after protracted talks with the Americans and with certain corrections, agreed to be the sponsors of such a draft. According to Ambassador Djokic, Russia proposed its draft of the resolution on the further suspension of sanctions against Yugoslavia, which, however, did not gain the support of the Contact Group members.

Ambassador Djokic, Yugoslav representative in the United Nations, looking at last night's session of the UN Security Council, emphasized that various interpretations of individual provisions of the resolution arose in the debate as well as that those who voted in favor of the resolution were of the opinion that individual provisions did not reflect the true state of affairs as all the reports that the UN monitoring mission had sent to the UN Security Council had been very positive.

In a statement for Radio Belgrade, Ambassador Djokic emphasized that the UN mission's reports spoke of consistent implementation of the Yugoslav Government decision pertaining to the flow of humanitarian aid on the border with the Srpska republic and also about the very good cooperation of this mission with the FRY authorities.

In this sense, Ambassador Djokic emphasized, overall all three reports were very positive and it was thus expected that the UN Security Council will not merely accept them but as far as abolition of sanctions goes make a step further—abolish them.

Ambassador Djokic explained Yugoslavia's stance that the resolution passed is not merely contrary to the peace process but brings it into question. For this reason Yugoslavia is not willing to tolerate blackmail or succumb to such forms of pressures which are not geared toward further development of the peace process but toward the realization of particular political interest of individual UN Security Council members. [passage omitted]

#### Sanctions Period Considered

*LD2204151795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1407 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 22 (TANJUG)—The UN Security Council, pressured by the United States and Germany, made yet another hard to explain move when it decided to shorten the period of suspension of certain sanctions against Yugoslavia from 100 to 74 days and set new conditions.

At the very moment when Belgrade is being praised, from many sides, for its engagement in the peace process and efforts toward ending the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Security Council, instead of rewarding Yugoslavia, punishes it once again. Russian and Chinese representatives on the Council also spoke along these lines.

Russian ambassador Sergey Lavrov said he believed Resolution 988 encourages forces of war and not peace. He said the Council had been fully justified to adopt further measures to encourage Yugoslavia in its activities. Chinese ambassador Li Zhaoxing also said the resolution was a step backward in the peace process. He said Yugoslavia deserved to be rewarded and not punished.

The shortening of the period of suspension by 25 days, under the current circumstances, does not mean much. However, when the decision is viewed within the framework of peace efforts, one cannot but conclude that both Americans and Germans panicked at the opening of the process of sanctions' lifting initiated by Danube basin and Black Sea region countries.

For the U.S. and Germany, those 25 days are a kind of symbolic political satisfaction which they needed to prove their stand to both Croats and Muslims. Americans and Germans have this time again demonstrated their place in the peace process, in fact their bias and lack of objectivity, and their policy of double standards.

Croatia, which no longer hides the fact that its regular troops are engaged in Bosnia, remains protected, just like the Muslims, who drastically violated the already fragile ceasefire in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Security Council tolerates also violations of the resolution banning arms sales in the territory of former Yugoslavia, adopted in September 1991, when Bosnian Muslims are concerned.

The almost week-long haggling at the Security Council over the final text of Resolution 988 has shown that the principle of suspending sanctions, actually the bit by bit extensions, can only serve those pushing the war option. That is the very reason why Belgrade's official stand is clear and categoric—the sanctions must be lifted absolutely and unconditionally because that is the only way Yugoslavia will be equal in position with the other sides in the peace process.

#### **Moscow Bound To End Sanctions**

*AU2104190695 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 21 Apr 95*

[Interview with Russian Ambassador Gennadiy Shikin by Dusko Petrovic at the promotion of the Russian (Sovero) catalog for economy in the Russian Embassy in Belgrade on 21 Apr—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Petrovic] Do intensive contacts such as this one reflect the Russian initiative concerning the easing, that is, the lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia?

[Shikin] Of course, all this is in line with our present policy, which is supported by both the legislative bodies and our government and president. This policy is based on the fact that we believe that the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] has fulfilled all its obligations from the well known Security Council resolutions, and now there is no legal grounds for maintaining these sanctions against Yugoslavia. We are committed to the lifting of the sanctions. We will do all we can to have the sanctions lifted.

#### **Perisic on War Profiteering, Future of Army**

*LD2204161495 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1130 GMT 22 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 Apr (SRNA)—The chief of general staff of the Yugoslav Army, Colonel-General Momcilo Perisic, has warned that the Yugoslav Army has over 100,000 people and is the core of the future million-strong army of our people.

In an interview for the latest issue of the Belgrade weekly INTERVJU, Gen. Perisic stressed that the Yugoslav Army's potential was a good guarantee for the protection of the territorial sovereignty and integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Commenting on speculations that he would be replaced, Gen. Perisic said that they were spread by individuals influenced by those who wanted to marginality the army.

"The question is whether those who would like to see me removed from this position know the situation in which our nation has found itself, and also, whether they are ready to sacrifice their lives and their comfort to defend its people," the chief of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff stressed.

Stressing that he completely shared the fate of the people who have lost their dearest and their material goods in the war, Gen. Perisic said that "there are many people, safe away from the battlegrounds, who are accumulating riches by exploiting the blood of the Serb people, while they are going as far as portraying themselves as heroes."

"I know that when I took over this duty I shortened my life in the service, and that there will be no material gains in it. I also know that my only satisfaction is to prevent the realization of what has been prepared and is being prepared for my people," Gen. Perisic said at the end of the interview for the Belgrade weekly INTERVJU.

#### **Belgrade's Legal Obstacles to Privatization**

*95BA0191C Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 95 p 25*

[Article by Milan R. Kovacevic: "Wasteland of Privatization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When privatization began in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] back in 1989, the concept of "workers' shareholding" was chosen. Obviously it was difficult to give up self-management, and so as a compromise social capital started to be sold to workers on favorable terms. This was already missing the opportunity to gather more funds through the sale of social capital. Workers are not the best customers for the purchase of capital. There are better ones.

Privatization in the SFRY nevertheless developed most rapidly in Serbia. That paradox has been intensified, since the other changes as part of the transition to a different social system, during that entire period to this very day, have remained most modest in Serbia. Also striking is the very different pace and method of the privatization of social capital in Serbia and Montenegro, which are jointly what is left of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].

In Serbia, more than two-thirds of the total social capital was nationalized and privatized. Admittedly, a Serbian law in 1991, violating a federal one, retarded privatization by introducing more restrictive conditions. Inflation later abundantly corrected that, and became the factor most responsible for privatization. Since the revaluation of the remainder of the price of purchased shares in social capital was only conducted once a year, it was easy to buy up more and more such shares before the end of the year.

In contrast to that, in Montenegro there was a requirement that the price of purchased shares in social capital be revalued up until the moment of payment. The registration of shares therefore proceeded somehow, but payments were slow. Workers preferred to purchase things more necessary than shares. Only a modest portion of social capital was privatized. It is only in terms of

the extent of nationalization that the situation in both republics is similar, although it occurred in different ways.

For decades, our authors praised the concept of social property, and ranked it qualitatively higher than state property and management of the economy. When other countries with state ownership of the economy also accelerated privatization, we forgot about the previous rankings, and the process of the nationalization of social capital was accelerated. Between one-third and one-half of the total social capital in the FRY went directly into the state's hands.

Last year, we witnessed once again diametrically different decisions in the "two eyes in the same head." In order to speed up slow privatization, a Montenegrin law donated 10 percent of the total social capital. The period for interest-free repayment was extended to 10 years. In contrast to that, in Serbia, a derivative legal act illegally nationalized and confiscated shares that had been bought long before. The extent of the crossed eyes was increased.

In contrast to those divergent events, the intentions remained different. When the FRY constitution was shaped at the end of April 1992, it was clear that the republics' constitutions and many laws usurped by the republics would have to be changed and coordinated with it. A constitutional law thus specified that a new federal law on social capital would have to be passed by the end of 1992. The privatization of social capital would thus once again be regulated in the same way by the new federation.

Several years have now passed since then, and the legislative confusion is continuing. Furthermore, the disorder is apparently beginning to be sanctioned. The illegality and unconstitutionality of the law on the conditions and procedure for converting social property to other forms of property, whose provisions directly violate the provisions of the federal Law on Social Capital, was brought before the Federal Constitutional Court. The Federal Constitutional Court adopted a decision that the future federal Law on Social Capital should no longer be what it once was.

In the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court, in the future the federation should "regulate only the foundations of property law relations," and the republics themselves can continue to regulate the conditions for the privatization of social capital. The Court remained deaf to the question of why, however, the republic laws were violating the federal law, even if it was only establishing the "foundations." What, then, would happen to a question seeking to clarify the mysterious borderline between the "foundations" and other regulations? How can that foundation conflict with the specific regulations?

The statement that "in the view of the Federal Constitutional Court, the determination of the value of the

social capital that is the subject of the sale is not the subject of the contract" also indicates the quality of the law and the judgment. Really, anything can be concluded from that sort of dilletantism, according to which the subject of the sale is not the subject of the contract. In the opinion of that glorious court, the provision of the Law on Foreign Investments that guarantees foreign investors no change in the clauses of contracts and the provisions of the "law that was in effect on the day when the contract became legally valid" cannot defend against the reduction in the share of foreign investors, i.e., the nationalization of their shares. Then what does it even guarantee?

With that kind of "law" it could even happen that both the federal and republic laws still said that "if the purchase of shares is done in installments, the enterprise is required to conduct an annual revaluation of the value of the unpurchased part of the shares in accordance with the growth of retail prices," and that the derivative legal act with the rather long name nevertheless prescribes for five years retroactively, in some years monthly, and in some years even daily revaluation. Furthermore, that derivative legal act also figured in rates of inflation that were never published before then and never corresponded to reality. Two different inflations were established in the same country at the same time.

That derivative legal act disputed that the social capital had even been purchased when it really was purchased. Violating both the Law on Obligation Relations and the Law on Securities, that derivative legal act prescribed a new "revaluation" budget according to which it would be calculated that a larger portion of the stockholders' shares had been nationalized. That will not happen to them only if they pay several times over what they have already paid. One cannot decline to repay the money.

We will not dwell on the derivative legal act further. It is not worth it. No one has even defended it publicly yet. No one familiar with law, economics, and reason could say anything good about it. It is up to the Serbian Constitutional Court to make a statement about its legality, and thus judge whether there is any law left.

After everything that has happened in regard to the nationalization of shares, it is difficult to assess the intentions of the authors of the derivative legal act. If it has to do with the appetite of an expensive state to gather more money later on, it is unlikely that that could be achieved. The economy's losses have increased and the social capital has lost value, especially measured by reduced wages.

In Belgrade, the citizens who were better off paid only 1,400 German marks apiece for 24,000 privatized apartments. The prices of apartments are rising, and they are selling better and better, and so a revaluation of them would be even more justified than a revaluation of capital. It is more likely that the purpose of nationalization, if it turns out that even a derivative legal act can overcome a law, is to preserve and increase social capital.

If that happens, the task of future privatization will be increased. It is not even rational to do it under conditions in which privatization has been halted, and it is not even known when or where it will start again. Above all, it is counterproductive in view of the fact that the profitability of social capital is much lower than that of share capital. After all, workers could improve their financial position by selling shares. That is what was planned last year when a tax on owned shares was introduced as of the beginning of this year.

Let us go back again to the two republics' contradictory trends last year, however. Someone may say that it is easy for Montenegro to donate social capital when it is no longer even mentioned in the constitution. That is why its law says that the privatization or nationalization of the economy is to be completed by the summer of 1996. In contrast to that, the Serbian constitution has perpetuated social capital, while the past has convincingly shown that it is most successfully increased by nationalization. The next to the last one had some sort of compensation. It is free, at least at first glance.

The destruction of shares may also turn out to be very costly for our future. It may permanently reduce the value of securities. That in turn would make it more difficult to create a market for stocks and other securities. Without a stock market, shares are papers with little value for the rest of the owners.

An amendment has been made to the new Law on Enterprises according to which one-third of the administrative and supervisory boards should be workers even at all private enterprises. In that way nationalization and the strengthening of social property in Serbia would be combined with a serious renewal of self-management. We have restricted the previous majority for foreign owners, and tightened import regimes, and we have high tariffs. What a celestial people!

### Serbia

#### Serbian Official: RSK To Export Oil to Serbia

LD2104172095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1508 GMT 21 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vukovar, 21 Apr (TANJUG)—The continuation of economic stabilization is the only way of thwarting the West's intention to crush Serbia's economy, Bosko Perošević, president of the Executive Council of Vojvodina, said in Vukovar today. [passage omitted]

Speaking about cooperation between Vojvodina and Serbia, on the one hand, and eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, on the other, he stressed that this cooperation ought to be more organized and that it was a positive fact that people in this part of Krajina did not want just aid, but also trade on equal terms.

Today, representatives of Vojvodina's sugar refineries and Krajina's oil industry met here and agreed to trade

oil for certain goods and raw materials that are necessary if the sowing season in Vukovar and its surrounding area is to proceed unhindered. This is the best form of cooperation that, among other things, also eliminates the war profiteers who have been making enormous profits by being middlemen between the two sides.

The talks between the businessmen of the Vukovar area and the president of the Executive Council of Vojvodina were hosted by Goran Hadžić, former president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK].

Following the talks, Perošević and his aides visited the Agricultural Combine of Vupik in Vukovar.

#### Hints of Cosić's Return Get Lukewarm Reception

AU2304173995

[FBIS Editorial Report] Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian on 20 April on page 18 carries a report by Stana Ristić, who pooled reactions of various parties to a recent statement by former FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] President Dobrica Cosić, indicating that he might return to the political arena. As she writes, the statement was given "after the annual conference of the Democratic Party" when Cosić said that "the Democratic Party is capable of implementing changes without which there can be no future" and also that he might in a given moment return to the political scene—"if the need for it arises and if the young generation wants it."

As Ristić writes, Uroš Suvaković of the Young Socialists and Dragan Popović of the Yugoslav United Left, "after consultations with their older party comrades concluded that this statement of Cosić's did not merit a comment." "Why attach a greater importance to it than it deserves," Suvaković is reported to have said.

"It is clear," Zarko Jokanović from the New Democracy is reported to have said, "why Zoran Djindjić became a spokesman for Radovan Karadžić; however, it is not clear why Dobrica Cosić at his advanced age is coveting the post of the spokesman for Zoran Djindjić. It is sad when an old man, trying to make amends for the mistakes of his youth, grabs hold of dead wood." According to the reporter, Jokanović insisted that she print the following statement once made by Cosić: "Serbia needs new people and new policies, Serbia needs the New Democracy!"

Aleksandar Vucić, representative of the young in the Serbian Radical Party, according to the author, doubts the correctness of the interpretation of Cosić's public statement and admits to not understanding why Cosić appealed particularly to the young generation. As Vucić is reported to have said, the party respects Cosić for his literary achievements. However, in order to support him, Cosić "would have to present the political platform that he champions toward which all Serbian citizens could then take a stance. The Serbian Radical Party has nothing against such a move and we would in such a case consider Mr. Cosić a political rival."

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"One could have assumed," author Stana Ristic muses, "that Srdja Popovic, the representative of the young in the Democratic Party, would defend the views of Dobrica Cosic." Popovic is reported to have said that "with several years of work and efforts behind him, Mr. Cosic proved that he favors changes. The Democratic Party, being a party of younger people, is seriously counting on him."

Dejan Cucic, a representative of the young in the Democratic Party of Serbia, is quoted as having said that his party would welcome Cosic's return on the political scene "only if he (Cosic) had the intention to stand up against the regime in Serbia and President Slobodan Milosevic." According to the reporter, Cucic is skeptical about the prospects of this happening, saying that "in any case one should doubt that Dobrica Cosic could take the lead of the democratic movement in Serbia successfully and sincerely."

Aleksandar Stamatovic, representative of the young in the Serbian Renewal Movement, reminds the reporter of the fact that Cosic, to a great extent, contributed to the fact that more than 400,000 young people have left Serbia over the past few years. With this in mind Stamatovic doubts that young people would want "Serbia of the old man Cosic." Stamatovic maintains that Cosic in his efforts to return to politics "does not care about the price that others would have to pay in the name of this, namely, that Serbia would get involved in a total war and that the Serbs would turn against the Serbs in the country. We should be spared of the revengeful ambitions of an old man," Stamatovic is quoted as having said. He is also suspicious of Cosic's concern for the young generation, concluding ominously "woe to the youth and the country of which Cosic takes care."

#### Weekly Suggests Rift Among Bosnian Serbs

AU2104170095 Podgorica MONITOR in  
Serbo-Croatian 21 Apr 95 p 15

[Commentary by Vladimir Jovanovic: "Coup Against Mladic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The rift among the Bosnian Serbs is deepening. According to available information, the last session of the "Srpska republic" passed in a heavy exchange of recriminations between the deputies loyal to Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. The latest events in Sanski Most came as no little surprise even to those who had seen the rift among the Serbs in Bosnia developing much earlier.

The session went on for a full 30 hours, and was opened by Gen. Mladic's report on the military and political situation. Most of the deputies refused to accept the report, which then led to a veritable barrage of accusations directed against Gen. Mladic. According to a REUTER reporter, who cites an anonymous source from the Bosnian Serb leadership, Gen. Mladic presented a

gloomy picture of the chances of his forces in resisting further advances by the Bosnian troops. According to REUTER, Mladic was attacked in "an unprecedented fashion" because of "the territorial losses in northern Bosnia (Majevisa), the communications transmitter on Vlasica, and because of the botched operation and failure at neutralizing the troops of Bosnian Gen. Dudakovic in western Bosnia."

On 16 April many news agencies carried SRNA's report on the meeting and conclusions adopted by the Serbian Democratic Party [SDA] deputy bench and main Committee, which had been forwarded by Velibor Ostojic, chairman of the SDS Executive Committee. The report says, inter alia: "Based on these conclusions, the assembly should task the Supreme Command (that is, Karadzic—author's remark) with the establishment of full control over the General Staff of the Srpska republic army with the recommendation that the supreme commander should, if need be, reconstruct it."

"The supreme commander is recommended to demand from the General Staff of the Serb Republic Army special reports on enemy offensives, and to organize counselling for officers for morale and information, and—if need be—to form a commission to control the state institutions of the Srpska republic army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs."

This report was withdrawn after 15 minutes owing to "imprecise interpretation."

However, MONITOR's sources claim that a great purge is about to take place in the leadership of the "Srpska republic" army, and that—following the well-known events and his resignation in January—Gen. Manojlo Milovanovic is now in the operative headquarters in Han-Pijesak, but that "he is depressed and in a bit of a dazed state." The same source says that a fierce conflict has developed in the "Srpska republic" police, among the factions loyal to individual politicians from the very top of the leadership of this parastate. Following the uproar over Centrax, which is under Momcilo Krajisnik's control and holds the monopoly in the oil and cigarette smuggling business, now special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been organized. They serve as pretorian guards to politicians confronted with one another. There have even been reports of bloody clashes among these formations, "which resemble Mexican desperadoes," as our sources claim. After all, at the assembly session Gen. Mladic himself accused the politicians of criminal activities, and some sources say that, standing at the assembly rostrum, he even waved documents in the air, documents that he said were corroboration of his accusations.

The main question now is whether the myth about the Serbian unity and invincibility over the Drina is disintegrating. The world's satellite TV stations have been showing footage of the Bosnian batteries in line on Vlasica, "the roof of Bosnia," while in the background a

gigantic (60 by 30 meters) flag with the Bosnia-Herzegovina state coat of arms is fluttering in the wind. The Serb losses from 20 March, when the offensive was launched, are counted in hundreds, while the Bosnia-Herzegovina 7th Corps is still advancing from Vlasica toward Skender Vakuf, and descending into the valley of the Vrbas. The first significant defeat of the Serb army in Bosnia was enough for the myth about Gen. Mladic as "the descendant of the Kosovo knights" to disintegrate

completely into mudslinging from the very ones that had glorified him just until recently.

Many people are talking now about the existence of a conspiracy in the Pale leadership, and—after the disbanded Typhoon—a new imaginary service for intelligence work and "executions" has emerged under the name of Sigma, but no one can yet identify who controls this group. Perhaps the time of "dog eat dog" is here?

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